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Abstract

This study attempts to explore the multi-faceted challenges and hindrances
brought upon the British East India Company by piracy in the Indian Ocean World.
European and American pirates in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries
influenced economic, political, and social factors in the Indian Ocean. The Angrians in
the eighteenth century did the same, constituting an indigenous piratical threat. These
forms of piracy encouraged the British East India Company to gradually bolster military
strength to mobilize against them. With their own built-up strength, Royal navy support,
local Maratha allies, and internal conflict within the Angres, the British East India
Company managed to crush the Angres and then project their military power into the
Indian subcontinent. This proved formative leading up to the creation of the British
Empire there with the military leadership of Robert Clive. To support this point, this
study utilized published collections of government and court-related documents, letters,
journals, newspapers, travel literature, and personal accounts.
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Figure 1. “Indoustan ou Etats du Mogol.” Robert de Vaugondy.
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Introduction

The fourteenth through the eighteenth centuries have been classified by writers
such as Eric Wolf, Robert Marks, and Andre Gunder-Frank as the starting point of
globalization. This merely means that multiple processes and communities from far-flung
locations around the world began to interact with one another in a new and emerging
global marketplace characterized by capitalism. Europeans acted as the principle
facilitators in this system of exchange. They had the drive and the resources to begin an
age of exploration which brought them into contact with pre-existing regional networks
of exchange that had formed among non-Europeans. This eventually brought associate
networks under the sway of European political and economic entities primarily engaging
in highly extractive forms of commerce. Many non-European entities did indeed profit
from interacting with Europeans. A considerable measure of European business activity
involved gaining enough capital to trade with prosperous Asian political entities, most
notably China, for highly desirable trade commodities such as silk, porcelain, and tea.
As Europeans promoted the spread of an increasingly world-wide capitalist
market, European and American piracy also expanded its reaches. Piracy followed in the
wake of legitimate business seen in the form of overseas commerce undertaken by state
sanctioned traders and trading companies. Global European businesses and trading
entities, such as the British East India Company, sent resources into territories and waters
previously untraversed by their ships. European and American pirates followed them.
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Pirates often had the same motivations and the same modes of operation as their lawful
business opponents. They sought profit by seizing the cargoes from ships and selling the
goods in port. The pirates even incorporated capitalist concepts like capital, shareholding,
and dividends. These were collected by financial backers and pirate crewmen. In
furthering the theme of globalization, bands of pirates from different global regions came
into contact with other pirates, European entities, and indigenous entities in their quest
for profit on the seas, creating an environment of business competition by seizing
shipborne merchandise.
This pattern of piracy following in the literal wake of capitalist-driven shipping
appeared prominently in the Indian Ocean. Trading companies, exemplified by the
British East India Company, expanded operations into the region, tempting European and
American pirates to pursue. In defense against this threat, the British East India Company
diverted part of its resources to take anti-piracy measures. I argue that as the British East
India Company grew in power and influence in the Indian Ocean, alongside increasing
challenges posed by piracy, more assets had to be mobilized against piracy with greater
effectiveness. Piracy had detrimental effects on the Company ranging from substantial
financial losses to upsetting political and social dynamics in the region and potentially
abroad. These effects required the British East India Company to put down such sea
forces. The sole focus of this study is American and European piracy around the time of
the later seventeenth century (c.a. 1680) and into the mid-eighteenth century (c.a. 1760).
This will also include native manifestations of piracy, most notably that of Western India
in the form of the Angres. The geographical parameters of this study are the Indian Ocean
from the Cape of Good Hope at South Africa to the coasts of India.
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One of the earliest texts concerning American and European piracy is A General
History of the Pyrates, written purportedly by a “Captain Johnson,” but most likely
written by Daniel Defoe in the early-eighteenth century.1 Although thought to be partly
fictional, this publication still gives insight regarding contemporary views of piracy. It is
a substantial edition of primary source material. Defoe examined the lives of multiple
pirates who began their seafaring careers in the waters of Europe or the Americas and
transported their trade to the Indian Ocean. The volume includes such men like Henry
Avery, Edward England, Thomas Tew, Captain Kidd, and others. As previously
mentioned, some of the information is fictionalized and can reasonably be called into
question. This particularly applies to the latter parts of the volume, when Defoe ran out of
more factual news and material that he expected for his second publication.2
In regards to historiography, writers and historians have not conducted studies
focused solely on how the British East India Company combatted piracy in the Indian
Ocean and how pirates affected Company operations and status. These episodes are
recorded within much broader focused texts on the entire history of the British East India
Company as a whole from its inception in 1600 to its end in the mid-nineteenth century.
John Keay’s The Honourable Company: A History of the English East India Company
fulfills the afforementioned role. It is an excellent and wide-ranging work documenting
the Company’s history with acknowledgement of pirates proving to be a nuisance to
operations in the Indian Ocean. It vividly illustrates how pirates affected its economic and
political status in relation to Mughal leaders of the time, often eliciting swift penalties
1

Daniel Defoe, Manuel Schonhorn, ed. A General History of the Pyrates (Columbia, South
Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1972), xxii.
2
Defoe, xxxvii, xlii.
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from the Company for the loss of their shipping. Keay’s main argument is that “The East
India Company was as much about the East as about India. Its Pacific legacies would be
as lasting as those in the Indian Ocean; its most successful commercial venture was in
China, not India.”3
Another topic area of British East India Company historiography worth
mentioning is that revolving around Robert Clive. Monographs about the most notable
and renowned Company member regard events centered around the Battle of Plassey in
1757. They fail to give thorough discussion and analysis of his contribution to the
longstanding effort against piracy in the Indian Ocean. Most monographs detail the same
narrative. Robert Clive lounged around Bombay until Admiral Watson offered him a
place on his expedition against the Angrian pirate fortress on Gheria. Clive led the land
forces in the operation, won, and received a large sum of money from the loot.
Afterwards, he carried on his military career and won the Battle of Plassey against the
Nawab of Bengal. Around this point, the narrative is usually ended. This form of
narrative ignores the far reaching influence of piracy in British East India Company
history, even the full influence of Clive himself. His anti-piracy operation provided
valuable experience in conducting combined land-sea operations similar to those he
conducted later in the Third Carnatic War against the French and their ally the Nawab of
Bengal. Clive scholarship also rejects the existence of Malabar and Angrian piracy as a
longstanding threat and fails to demonstrate the form and status it had reached in the
latter half of the 1750s.4

3

John Keay, The Honourable Company: A History of the English East India Company (London:
Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), xxii.
4
A. Mervyn Davies, Clive of Plassey: A Biography (New York: Charles Scribner’s and Sons, 1939)
142-143.; Sir John Malcolm, The Life of Robert, Lord Clive: Collected From the Family Papers
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More general studies regarding the atmosphere of commerce and trade focus on
aspects and trends in the Indian Ocean world. One such work is Philip MacDougall’s
article “Naval Resistance to Britain’s Growing Power in India, 1660-1800: The Saffron
Banner and the Tiger of Mysore.” MacDougall claims it serves as the first attempt to
examine how the navies of Indian polities interacted with Europeans. He sees indigenous
polities as wielding four different strategies to resist or benefit themselves in relations
with encroaching European political and trading interests, ranging from open conflict to
acquiescence in the form of approving terms of trade and allowing factories to be
established. To illustrate the nature of Indian naval resistance, he adheres to analysis of
the Malabar and Konkan Coasts. This important study highlights Maratha and Angrian
naval resistance to the British East India Company. Also, MacDougall explains the
origins and development of the force faced by the Company in the 1750s. He contends
that the seemingly pirate-like naval activities of Kanhoji Angre and his successors were
valid manifestations of the will of a sovereign Maratha polity and that the Maratha
structure later splintered. He fervently believes that the British East India Company
painted the Angres as criminals to rally support and attack an intimidating political entity
current and future to British East India Company trade on India’s coasts.5
Many historical writings have studied the topic of American and European pirates
in the Caribbean and Atlantic Ocean maritime worlds. They have especially covered the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This research encourages the study of American
Communicated by The Earl of Powis, Three volumes (London: John Murray, 1836) 134-135; Robert Harvey,
Clive, the Life and Death of a British Emperor (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 122-124.
5

Philip MacDougall, “Naval Resistance to Britain’s Growing Power in India, 1660-1800: The
Saffron Banner and the Tiger of Mysore,” Worlds of the East India Company, Vol. 10: (Woodbridge, UK:
The Boydell Press, 2014), xiii-xiv, 86-87, 90.
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and European pirates in the Indian Ocean who expanded their theater of operations by
sailing there. In so doing, they sailed their methods, technology, ideologies, and capitalist
quest for profits into the Indian Ocean. They clashed multiple times with the systems and
entities they preyed upon.
A modern text that covers American and European piracy as a whole is Between
the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates and the Anglo-American
Maritime World, 1700-1750, by Marcus Rediker. The author argues that “The tar [sailor]
was caught between the devil and the deep blue sea.” In other words, the common sailor
had to contend with the dual stressors of a near autocratic institutionalized world and the
harsh natural conditions that defined life at sea. These stressors influenced common
seamen to create their own ways to deal with this hard mode of life.6 His focus is
predominantly on the experiences of merchant seamen, many of which turned to piracy as
a way to escape the stressors of harsh rule of naval and merchant marine captains.
Rediker showed piracy to be a seaman’s counterculture movement against the system,
allowing men to become part of a broader, freer, and more democratic brotherhood of the
seas.
Some historians attempted to look at the lives of individual pirates and/or pirate
crews. One of these is Robert C. Ritchie’s Captain Kidd and the War Against the Pirates.
In it, he examined piracy as a widespread global trend that the English sought to suppress
with great vigor, but also investigated the life of Scottish privateer and later pirate,
Captain William Kidd, in a biographical context. Ritchie follows the turns of misfortune
Kidd faced while explaining the context in which they occurred. Kidd’s career

6

Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen, Pirates and the
Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 5.
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highlighted a moment of transition in American and European piracy when the English
began to develop new and more effective measures to crack down on pirates. The
historian’s central argument stated that the effort made by the English to capture and
prosecute Kidd led to a drastic change in how Europeans in general prosecuted pirates
and pursued the aim of empire.7
Additional investigation has been done in the same vein at the beginning of this
century. Historian Patricia Risso wrote an article in the Journal of World History titled
“Cross-Cultural Perceptions of Piracy: Maritime Violence in the Western Indian Ocean
and Persian Gulf Region during a Long Eighteenth Century.” She chiefly analyzes piracy
in the Indian Ocean through the academic disciplines of maritime law and linguistics.
Risso declares that economic and political motivations are important to analyze, but
proposes the primary focus be on cultural elements. For example, analysis of vocabulary
and rhetoric should be considered in regards to maritime violence and competition.8
Basically, the seafaring power of England had defined the terms “piracy” and “privateer,”
laying out in their legal codes and language specific definitions of these acts. The eastern
Islamic world, including Mughal Empire and western India, interpreted piracy differently
from the English in their legal codes and Arabic/Arabic-related languages. These
definitions over time clashed and intermingled with each other, leading to arguments and
disagreements between both the English and members of the Islamic world, and added to
the confusion as to who actually operated as a pirate and who did not. Seaborne raiders
7

Robert C. Ritchie, Captain Kidd and the War Against the Pirates (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1986), 2.
8

Patricia Risso, Journal of World History, “Cross-Cultural Perceptions of Piracy: Maritime Violence
in the Western Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf Region during a Long Eighteenth Century,” Volume 12,
Number 2, Fall 2001, University of Hawai'i Press, 2.
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from the Muslim world sometimes committed acts that were not recognized as piracy by
their mainland political systems. Such is true with the English as well.
Peoples and political powers along the edges of the Indian Ocean supposedly saw
these practices in a different light. Patricia Risso claims that Islamic peoples did not
commit acts of piracy and privateering because they did not conceptualize these
behaviors in their laws and languages in the same way as the English. She illustrates this
point by examining two blocks of time: 1690-1720 and 1790-1820. In the first block, she
examines Captain William Kidd and Kanhoji Angre, comparing and contrasting the two
regarding their contexts of operation. Kidd acted as part of the Pirate Round, sailing to
the Indian Ocean bent on earning profit. Kanhoji appeared to be living in a quasiautonomous coastal state on India’s Konkan Coast, seizing ships like a pirate and
operating based on private agreements with local leaders. The second block of time
regards British East India Company relations with peoples of the Persian Gulf. It suggests
that the British East India Company saw maritime violence in this region at this time as it
saw fit, using such definitions to fulfill their own policy concerns.
Other interdisciplinary approaches scrutinize historical pirates and pirate crews.
For example, in Pirates and Mutineers of the Nineteenth Century: Swashbucklers and
Swindlers, editor Grace Moore claims “the nineteenth century heralded the great age of
the literary pirate, even as piracy in the real world was on the wane.” Since then, “our
appetite for pirate tales remains as hearty as ever.”9 This edited volume is a compilation
of chapters from various historians that examines seventeenth and eighteenth century
historical pirates through the lens of literature and other art forms related to them. For
9

Grace Moore, ed., Pirates and Mutineers of the Nineteenth Century: Swashbucklers and
Swindlers (Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), 1.
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instance, writer Joetta Harty in her chapter “Playing Pirate: Real and Imaginary Angrias
in Branwell Bronte’s Writing,” surveys the influence of real life piracy on the writing of
the Bronte sisters. Harty argues that the Brontes’ stories reflected real historical events
and figures. There is evidence of influence coming from news regarding the Angrian
pirates of West India.10
One key point to keep in mind when studying piracy is the ambiguity of terms
relating to those who seize ships and ocean-borne goods. The phrase “one man’s terrorist
is another man’s freedom fighter” can be applied to “pirate” and “privateer.” A “pirate” is
typically a criminal who practices unlawful seizure of ships and accompanying goods on
a body of water. Such actions were commonly punished by early modern and modern
governments by arrest, prosecution, and execution. There is also the term “privateer.” A
privateer is someone authorized by a government or political entity to seize ships and
goods belonging to a particular political entity or entities, as designated in a letter of
marque, during periods of war or quasi-war. Early modern and modern European
countries often issued the captains of privately-owned or joint-stock company owned
ships letters of marque to prey upon the shipping of their enemies at sea. These
documents made the theft lawful in the eyes of the employing.
The line between “pirate” and “privateer” became muddled on occasion,
depending on whether or not a country or political entity recognized the legitimacy of
another power, or when advantageous. This can be seen with interactions between the
British East India Company and political entities clustered around the edges of the Indian
Ocean world. In the case of the Mughal Empire, the idea has been posed that those the
British East India Company saw as “pirates” are now seen by historians like Risso and
10

Moore, Pirates and Mutineers of the Nineteenth Century, 48.
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MacDougall as the naval leaders of certain princely states in the Indian subcontinent.
Similarly, they have claimed that “pirate” has been used as a matter of convenience. Like
Risso pointed out, a lot of perceptions regarding piracy and the legitimate or illegitimate
use of force depended on linguistic and legal factors regarding attacks on ships. In the
application of such force sovereignty also played a key role. A lot of armed maritime
players claimed affiliation in some part with land-based political systems, believing their
mode of sovereignty even trumped that of over players. In the case of the British East
India Company, such factors legitimized a mercantile-based company to take armed
actions against seaborne enemies that posed a threat commercially and politically.11
Company officials customarily engaged in armed conflict in the East against the
wishes of the understandably more business-minded Board of Directors. Directors judged
Company military expenditures as taking away from potential profit from themselves and
other shareholders. Pirates, on the other hand, existed as a threat to East India Company
business. In this light, military expenditures utilized for the combatting and prevention of
piracy were seen instead as sound investments, a way to cut costs and reduce risk. These
actions could now be seen differently and not solely as pointless military trivialties. This
use of terminology also legitimized near imperialistic economic expansion, like with the
British East India Company involvement and expansion of influence into the Gulf of
Hormuz. In India, the seafaring peoples of the Gulf were seen as pirates and not as
legitimate political entities. This validated military action against them and the resulting
occupation.

11

Risso, Journal of World History, “Cross-Cultural Perceptions of Piracy: Maritime Violence in the
Western Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf Region during a Long Eighteenth Century,” 6-7.; MacDougall,
Worlds of the East India Company, Vol. 10, 62, 72.
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In some instances, individual privateering captains became pirates based on
opportunity. When wars ended and brought an end to privateering contracts, captains
might choose to continue their business of high seas plunder, technically switching
professions from “privateer” to “pirate.” This time, however, lawful seizure had now
become unlawful seizure to the issuer of the letter of marque. Such behavior depended on
the circumstances, like with what ocean-borne prey happened to be available. This is the
case with Captain Kidd, who at the prompting of his crew decided to make the career
change.12
In the year 1600, Queen Elizabeth I of England granted a charter to the “Company
of Merchants of London, Trading into the East-Indies.” This body of over two hundred
individuals received royal approval to trade in Africa, the Indian Ocean, and Asia “at
their own Adventures, Costs, and Charges.” By expending and accumulating wealth in a
joint-stock company system that focused on trade goods, they were meant to also be
improving the economic status and image of England. The state established limits on the
terms of this new trade. Ships could not carry an excess of £30,000 to obtain trade goods.
Also, those not given royal permission in this charter to conduct trade in the East Indies
could expect royal “indignation, and the forfeiture and loss of all the goods,
merchandizes, and other things whatever, which so shall be brought into this realm of
England, or any the dominions of the same….”13 A monopoly had been established and
would not exist without much competition from other entities; legal, piratical, and
sometimes somewhere in between.

12

Ritchie, Captain Kidd and the War Against the Pirates, 93-94.
East India Company Charter (1600). Accessed June 9, 2016.
http://www.lasalle.edu/~mcinneshin/356/wk06/EICcharter.htm.
13
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Strangely enough, with all these proclamations of conducting honest business in
trade goods, the English were well acquainted with piracy and privateering. English
methods to this effect had been to the detriment of the Spanish Empire up to this point.
Seafarers like Sir Francis Drake, Sir Walter Raleigh, and Sir John Hawkins preyed upon
Spanish ships and settlements in the Americas at the behest of Queen Elizabeth, who
issued such men letters of marque to do so. They were nautical multi-taskers; armed men
for hire, traders, and explorers. Sir Walter Raleigh, for instance, served the crown by
assisting English land forces, providing naval support to put down a rebellion in Ireland.
Soon after he sailed to the New World to explore and set up the short-lived colony of
Roanoke. Such men and methods led to the creation of the English navy and influenced
the businessmen intent on expanding commercial activity to the lands around the Indian
Ocean. Because of this type of policy, the lines between legitimate privateer and pirate
happened to be muddled from the very beginning of the East India Company and the start
of the era of European trade to the East in general.
As historian Marcus Rediker pointed out, many American and European sailors in
the Atlantic and Indian Ocean worlds straddled a fine line in regard to maritime
occupation labels. Such distinctions were frequently influenced by mere documentation
and happenstance actions. A captain of a ship could, all at once, be trader, pirate,
privateer, mercenary, explorer, and colonist as he rode the deep blue waves, churning in
foam at the bow. Looking up and beyond the wind-filled canvas sails he might see a
roiling deep gray storm on the horizon, a storm that could break his ship into kindling and
push him and his crew into dire straits. Such occurrences tested men and often influenced

13
them to lean on particular seafaring roles just to survive, and even to profit. Such men
were pushed towards piracy because privateering had not produced ample profits.14

14

Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, 83.
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Part I
The Pirate Round

By the later seventeenth century, many Europeans and Americans were well
acquainted with the rich trade being conducted in the East Indies by trading companies
like the British East India Company. The Pirate Round in this period led to an explosion
of piracy on its expanse. The Pirate Round is the name for the route where pirates sailed
from North America and the Caribbean to plunder shipping in the Indian Ocean for a
select season. At the end of this season, they would usually return to local ports or make
their way back to Atlantic ports. The British East India Company accumulated
merchandise at their port in London on the lower Thames River and filled warehouses for
later sale and the reaping of large amounts of revenue, enriching the Directors, investors,
and Company coffers for reinvestment as capital in further business ventures. Similar
business-minded men pursued the same business structure of the Company and created
their own joint-stock ventures in which they invested in particular ships to take part in
this trade, being non-Company or non-Crown government sanctioned. Similar individuals
also used this same business structure to semi-covertly hire “privateers” to become
pirates upon reaching the Indian Ocean. They were employed to attack legitimate

15
seaborne commercial traffic in the area and divert profits to themselves and their
financial backers.15
Scores of European and American ship masters and seamen received financial
patronage from interested investors in North America and the Caribbean to fit out ships
under the guise of “privateering” voyages. In the quests for profit, privateers usually
turned pirate, if they had not already ventured to Eastern waters with that preconceived
design from the start. During their season for hunting richly laden ships, such pirates did
not solely serve as a blight to the economies and shipping they preyed upon.
Additionally, they upset the facets of politics, society, and religion of multiple societies
bordering the Indian Ocean.
The lure of East Indies riches proved to produce better takings than limiting one’s
self to the cargo of one European nation’s merchant shipping. Ships of the Arabic and
Indian coasts carried the richest hauls of goods and treasure available, making them the
prime targets of privateers turned pirates. These were usually not included in letters of
marque. They were instead desired trading partners of European nations, which sought to
preserve adequate relations with them to continue the East Indies trade and the financial
benefits that came from it. Thus, privateers turned pirate to take this Indian and Arabic
wealth directly from its source, forcing themselves into the East Indies trade through
armed force. In reality, the East India Company was not set solely against pirates, but
against any and all who sought to disrupt their trade monopoly in the Indian Ocean. Illicit
maritime activities committed by American-backed pirates acted as an attempt for
American traders to edge their way into the rich East Indies trading world. Through

15

David Cordingly, Under the Black Flag: The Romance and the Reality of Life Among the Pirates
(New York: Random House, 1996), 89-90.
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piracy, they bypassed strict English maritime laws and attempted to create a foothold by
first wielding the ability to supply and sell goods to the pirates who used Madagascar as a
base of operations and for settlement.
Trade in the Indian Ocean had been purposefully limited by English policy in the
manner of the 1600 Charter that brought the English East India Company into creation.
They, and only they, were expected and allowed by the Crown to conduct English trade
with territories in the East Indies.16 In addition to this, Navigation Acts had been passed
around the 1660s. These are usually seen solely through the lens of American history as
targeting oceangoing commerce between England and its American colonies, but the
terms included all English commerce and subject dominions. The wording, however,
applied to all land under English control and those with which they had trading relations.
It stated “no goods or commodities whatsoever shall be imported into or exported out of
any lands, islands, plantations, or territories to his Majesty belonging or in his
possession…”17 Only English ships could carry goods involved in transactions between
England, colonies, and independent trading partners, such as the Mughal Empire and its
later splintered princely states. One could face harsh repercussions if he ignored these
Navigation Acts. Offenders could expect “the penalty of the forfeiture and loss of all the
goods and commodities which shall be imported into or exported out of any the aforesaid
places in any other ship or vessel, as also of the ship or vessel, with all its guns, furniture,

16

East India Company Charter (1600). Accessed June 9, 2016.
http://www.lasalle.edu/~mcinneshin/356/wk06/EICcharter.htm.
17
Excerpts from the Navigation Act. Accessed July 7, 2016.
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=4102.

17
tackle, ammunition, and apparel…” All cargo, the ship, and everything on the ship would
be confiscated by the Crown government and parceled out as it saw fit.18
Even though the English had established these terms, others always wanted to get
involved in the East Indies trade. Throughout English East India Company history,
employees usually referred to these illicit traders as “interlopers.” They were unwelcome
and essentially as bad as pirates in the eyes of the Company. Policies adopted by the
Company became even more muddled as the organization equated piracy and interloping
traders in its efforts to limit both. Historian John Keay alleged that the British East India
Company acted like pirates towards interloping traders.19

18

Excerpts from the Navigation Act. Accessed July 7, 2016.
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=3&psid=4102.
19
Keay, The Honourable Company, 176-177.
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Chapter 1
Economics and Piracy

The most prominent impact American and European piracy had on the Indian
Ocean world were of course mostly economic. This occurred in the form of pirates
seizing shipping and their encouragement of illicit forms of commerce not sanctioned by
the British crown government and the British East India Company. As such, this topic
area should be covered first in this discussion. The first economic effect seen is
composed of mainly the everyday operations of a sea-roving pirate vessel like Henry
Avery’s Fancy or William Kidd’s Adventure Prize seizing trading ships for moveable
wealth and cargo that could be easily sold off. This threat applied to almost all trading
vessels travelling across the Indian Ocean. Both the British East India Company and
indigenous shipping entities, like the Mughals and their affiliates, had to contend with the
possibility of pirates attacking their vessels. The second effect is that of piracy
encouraging other, more illicit forms of commerce that in the eyes of a select group of
individuals appeared to be part of illegitimate and illegal trade. Individuals that retained
positions as either British Crown government officials, British colonial officials, or
British East India Company leaders and employees believed that any trade being
conducted by British or British colonial traders in sectors outside predetermined zones
and by unlicensed individuals and shipping were subject to legal prosecution. In the

19
Indian Ocean of the late-seventeenth century, British colonial traders from the North
American colonies engaged in this sort of non-Crown government and non-British East
India Company sanctioned trade. These traders realized that an economic demand existed
among pirate crews and communities based on Madagascar. Both the British Crown
government and the English East India Company highly disagreed with trading with
pirates. Such trading in their eyes served as aiding criminals in their illegal activities and
as overstepping the bounds of the zone of trade prescribed only for the English East India
Company. Thus, traders shipping supplies to Madagascar to sell to pirates claimed to be
conducting slaving voyages to deal for cheap stocks of Malagasy slaves. These traders,
masquerading as slavers, did purchase and deliver slaves to North America, adding to the
influx of slaves in the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Furthermore, some ships engaged in this
trade transferred pirates to the North American coast. Ships on this return journey even
carried goods plundered from the East Indies trade, exchanged by the pirates for the
supplies brought to them by North American colonial traders. As such, these traders were
grossly stepping out of bounds in regards to the English East India Company charters and
navigation acts. Colonial and crown government officials soon caught onto the fact that
their own subjects widely engaged in piracy, aiding piracy, and other related illicit
economic activities. This led to a campaign to crack down on such practices.
American and European pirates during the late-seventeenth century caused
immense shipping losses in the Indian Ocean, typically using privateering and trade as an
excuse to go on voyages. One trading ship could make or break, could improve or destroy
the economic interests of anyone financially involved in a venture. Correspondingly,
pirates had the opportunity to make huge gains by capturing a ship. Documentation from
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this era illustrated the sheer amounts of wealth a pirate could obtain. For example, a letter
labeled as part of a series of forwarded documents from Secretary to the East India
Company to William Popple, endorsed on December 18, 1696, discussed how the pirate
Thomas Tew obtained such riches. Having a commission to take French shipping, he
“came out on pretence of loading negroes at Madagascar, but his design was always to go
into the seas, having about seventy men on his sloop of sixty tons. He made a voyage
three years ago in which his share was £8,000.” Whether he used this pretense multiple
times is uncertain, but the letter clearly mentioned at the time of its creation that Tew
happened to be on his third voyage of the Pirate Round. Officials expected him to return
to England’s North American colonies shortly.20
Records showed that pirates such as Thomas Tew sought more readily available
sources of profit in the practice of seizing trade goods and readily available wealth in the
form of precious metal objects and precious stones, particularly wealth onboard
indigenous shipping. The real prime targets for any pirate on the Pirate Round were local
East Indies shipping, particularly those belonging to the Great Mughal Emperor and/or
his subjects. The case of the Charles Henry, captained by Henry Avery, provides an
example of just one of many cases of this practice. A narrative given by Philip Middleton
dated August 4, 1696, claims that the pirates plundered European shipping en route, but
soon entered the Red Sea and “heard of two rich ships from Mocha bound to Surat.” The
crew of the Charles Henry caught up with the vessels in question and decided to engage.
Avery’s crew “came up with the smaller vessel, which made little or no resistance, but
the great ship fought for two hours, having about 1,300 persons on board. The other had
20
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700. They kept possession of both ships, and all the crew except one man boarded her by
turns, taking only provisions, necessaries and treasure, which was very great, but little in
comparison with what was on board…” The pirates gained further profits after
interrogating and torturing the captives. This yielded up “great quantities of jewels, and a
saddle and bridle set with rubies.” The pirates also relieved the women on board of their
personal jewelry. At the conclusion of this plunder and pillage, the crewmen disembarked
the Charles Henry at Mascarenas, each with £970 worth of loot.21
Similarly, Captain Kidd collected immeasurable spoils by capturing the Quedah
Merchant off the coast of India and other takings during his turn sailing the Pirate Round.
From the Quedah Merchant, he reportedly gained for himself and his crew approximately
£30,000 worth of goods and wealth. This came to be divided out, of course. Daniel Defoe
explained in his A General History of the Pyrates that the spoils were split to “two
hundred pounds a man, and having reserved forty shares to himself, his dividend
amounted to about eight thousand pounds sterling.”22 This is not, however, the sum total
of Captain William Kidd’s pirate career.
Documents closer to the time of Captain William Kidd’s prosecution, more
exactly his arrest by Governor Lord Bellomont of New York, show that large amounts of
his takings had been stowed onto the Quedah Merchant, which in turn had been secured
in a remote location in the Caribbean. Governor Lord Bellomont discussed this in a letter
from July 8, 1699 addressed to the Board of Trade. He wrote that “Kid had left the great
Moorish ship he took in India (which ship I have since found went by the name of the
21
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Quidah-Marchant), in a creek on the coast of Hispaniola, with goods to the value of
thirty thousand pounds.” However, he reportedly had obtained a sloop which he had
sailed back to New York with East Indies goods and precious metals. He appeared to be
attempting to create ready cash and bribe and buy his way back into English North
America and obtain pardon for any crimes he committed.23
In addition to blatant thievery, pirates also encouraged other forms of illicit
economic activity, encouraging colonial merchants to supply them. American merchants
operating out of the English Northeastern American colonies sensed a business
opportunity. It had become common knowledge that pirates embarked on the Pirate
Round, or the seasonal raid in the Indian Ocean and surrounding seas.24 These pirate
cruises obliged crews to make frequent stops for supplies and repairs and settle for short
or long spans on Madagascar or nearby islands. In Defoe’s section on Edward England’s
1720 voyage, he wrote: “They staid not long there [Madagascar], but after taking in water
and provisions, sail’d for the Coast of Malabar, which is a fine and fruitful country in the
East Indies, in the Empire of the Mughal, but immediately subject to its own Princes.”
Once on the coast, England and his crew “took several country ships, that is Indian
vessels, and one European, a Dutch ship, which they exchanged for one of their own, and
then came back to Madagascar.”25 England reportedly “staid not long here, after they had
clean’d their ships…” This last line refers to ship maintenance. The practice of cleaning a
ship meant the practice of careening. This is where sailors of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries pulled their vessel onto land and scraped and burned parasitic sea
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creatures off the bottom of the hull to prevent damage to the vessel. Other maintenance
activities consisted of using local resources and captured naval stores to attach fresh
timbers, ropes, sails, and caulking and pitch.26
Madagascar’s prominence as a popular pirate stop-off influenced American
traders to conduct slaving voyages in the area. This occurred, but on the journey out such
vessels frequently carried provisions like food, alcohol, arms, and ammunition
specifically meant to be sold to the pirate crews and communities for profit. Adam
Baldrige actually established a trading post on site to provide this service to pirates
onshore. He provided a detailed list of ships and cargoes that came to him on the island of
St. Mary’s just offshore of Madagascar. Like pirates had done, he recounted how he had
integrated himself into indigenous systems and established a home and trading outpost.
He recounted that “In May 91 I returned from War and brought 70 head of Cattel and
some slaves. Then I had a house built and settled upon St. Maries.”27
Since Adam Baldrige took part in trading goods from English American colonies,
he kept records of the transactions he made between American traders and pirates. He
mentioned how John Churcher sailed the Charles to St. Mary’s in August 7, 1693.
Frederick Phillips owned and financed the ship and the extensive and diverse load of
cargo. The goods imparted to Baldridge read as follows: “some Carpenters Tools, 5
Barrells of Rum, four Quarter Caskes of Madera Wine, ten Cases of Spirits, … three
Barrells of Cannon powder” and other goods. For this cargo, Baldridge gave Churcher
“1100 pieces 8/8 and Dollers, 34 Slaves, 15 head of Cattel, 57 barrs of Iron.” Additional
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information shows how Churcher did some additional trading nearby with other whites in
order to offload some of his goods to make room for more slaves.28
Adam Baldrige took on these goods and supplied them to pirates as well. He
recounts how on October 19, 1693, the pirate Captain Thomas Tew and his crew arrived
on St. Mary’s. Tew had arrived after he had “taken a Ship in the Red Seas that did belong
to the Moors.” Baldridge sold to them some of his cattle to add to their provisions. In
addition, he blatantly admitted that “I sold Captain Tew and his Company some of the
goods brought in the Charles from New York.” Baldridge showed complicity with piracy
in other like transactions as well. During August 1695, he bought goods from the
Charming Mary that had shipped out of Barbados. The Charming Mary then reportedly
left in October to sail to Madagascar “to take in Rice and Slaves.” Shortly after, in
December 7 of the same year, the Susana, commanded by Captain Thomas Weak, arrived
on St. Mary’s. They had failed to take any native shipping and needed to refresh their
stores. Baldrige related “they fitted out from Boston and Rhoad Island and had been in
the Red seas but made noe voyage by reason they mist the moors fleet. they Careened at
St. Maries and I sold them part of the goods bought of Mr. John Beckford out of
the Charming Mary and spaired them some Cattel.” He had an extensive victualling
business with pirate clientele.29
Baldridge also shows in his account how he traded in indigenous resources as
well, at least those procurable on St. Maries. Also, that there were indigenous modes of
trading going on. That is, Malagasy themselves traded with pirates like Baldridge and
other Americans and Europeans were doing. In many instances, as seen previously,
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Baldridge had sold crews the indigenous resources of cattle in order for them to have
meat provisions. This can be seen as early as 1691, when Captain Raynor had
successfully taken “a ship belonging to the Moors” and went to St. Maries to careen.
Baldridge admitted that “I supplyed them with cattel.” In return, the pirates gave him
weapons, ammunition, and iron bars. Indigenous modes of trading went on as well, as can
be seen with transactions hinted at in Baldridge’s account. He mentions how in October
19, 1693, that Thomas Tew’s crew “for their victualing and sea store they bought goods
from the negroes.” In other words, the native people of St. Maries. Also, on December 7,
1695, the ship Susana found itself supplied likewise: “for the most part they were
supplyed by the negroes.” The local indigenious people played an important part in this
trade as well.30
Baldridge was also in the position to be knowledgeable of other illicit trade
activity in the area, not just his own. He talked of other ships and traders operating in the
region. He offered more information for events that happened August 1695 involving the
Katherine, commanded by Captain Thomas Mostyn. The Katherine “had severall sorts of
goods in her. she sold the most to the White men upon Madagascar, where he had
Careened. he set saile from St. Maries for Mauratan on Madagascar to take in his Rice
and Slaves.” The mention of “White men upon Madagascar” refers undoubtedly to
pirates based there either temporarily or on a more permanent basis. Baldrige related
additional instances of this going on in June 1697, with other ships from New York
supplying “White men on Madagascar” and pirates.31
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A cross-oceanic system of commerce developed based on the demand for supplies
including slaves or the pretense of trading slaves. Businessmen in New England and other
British North American colonies, like Frederick Phillips, orchestrated the shipping and
goods involved in supplying pirates on Madagascar. Loading of such quantities and types
of goods like alcohol and firearms made sense when claiming to be trading for slaves.
William Watson, once a captive of pirates in the Indian Ocean, commented “During my
residence with the pirates, whose chief rendezvous is at an island called St. Mary’s near
Madagascar, I understood they were supplied with ammunition and all sorts of
necessaries by one Captain Baldrige and Lawrence Johnston, two old pirates that are
settled in the above islands, and are factors for one Frederick Phillips, who under the
pretense of trading to Madagascar for negro slaves, supplies these rogues with all sorts of
stores, consigning them to Baldridge and Johnston.” 32 Frederick Phillips took care of the
financing, had on-site managers, and in the end reaped profits from supplying pirates. Not
only that, they were ex-pirates who had stopped seizing cargo in favor of a new career of
dealing in this trade.
This outlawed trade flagrantly clashed with the trading and shipping security
interests of the British East India Company, even though the Company focused on trading
expensive trade goods from the East Indies and not on African slaves. Two main reasons
made this commerce extremely distasteful. Firstly, these unlawful traders supplied
American and European pirates in the Indian Ocean, thus showing complicity by
perpetuating the cycle of the Pirate Round. These provisions, along with spoils of
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plunder, helped maintain pirate crews and settlements that took part. East India Company
ships, notably Indiamen, were targets as well.
East Indiamen served as the prime type of shipping the English East India
Company used for transport. Captain Coneway piloted an English East India Company
East Indiaman out of Bengal. Around 1700, the pirate Captain Bowen seized this vessel
near Quillon, where the captain and crew sold the ship and seized goods. Pirate Captain
Howard, shortly before joining forces with Captain Bowen, also seized the English East
India Company Indiaman Prosperous. Then around 1702 the two joined up and boarded
the East Indiaman Pembroke, adding to their combined modest list of East India
Company captures and plundering.33
Secondly, and of equal importance, this unlawful commerce with pirates helped
Americans trade more directly with the East Indies. This seemed distasteful to the British
East India Company not only for acting as “interlopers,” or non-English East India
Company licensed trader infringing on their trade monopoly, but also because once the
traders in question offloaded their provisions, they tended to take on captured East India
goods in exchange. The traders then meant to sell these goods in British North American
ports. Traders willingly acted as fences for stolen property in this context. A letter from
Governor Bellomont of New York to the Council of Trade and Plantations illustrated this
point. It read “There is a great trade managed between this place and Madagascar from
whence great quantities of East India goods are brought, which are certainly purchased
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from pirates. I do not know what to do herein, and beg for your directions.”34 This
practice had seen growth in the colonies and had gotten out of hand.
This trans-oceanic system of trade that had sprung up based around the supplying
of pirates soon became all too apparent a problem to those affiliated with colonial or
crown governments and prompted action from them. James Vernon wrote to the Council
of Trade and Plantations instructing them “You are to consider what measures are to be
taken for suppressing such piracies, for destroying the fort they are said to have built in
the island Santa Maria near Madagascar (where they are supplied with provisions from
the West Indies).”35 Another letter, from Captain Thomas Warren of the H.M.S. Windsor
to the East India Company further illustrated the pirate presence and these transactions.
On Santa-Maria, near Madagascar, the pirates there “built a regular fortification of forty
or fifty guns. They have about 1,500 men, with seventeen sail of vessels, sloops, and
ships, some of which carry forty guns. They are furnished from New York, New England
and the West Indies with stores and other necessaries.”36
Measures to crack down on this illicit trade soon became mixed with efforts to
subdue Indian Ocean piracy. To follow up on the business endeavors of Frederick
Phillips and his associates, The Council of Trade and Plantations wrote to Governor
Richard Bellomont of New York dated October 25, 1698. In it, The Council addressed
Governor Bellomont, encouraging him to continue his anti-corruption and anti-piracy
measures. The letter mentioned Frederick Phillips and his business associate, Baldridge,
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specifically. It related “As to the settlement made there by Mr. Baldridge, he is one of the
most mischievous managers of the pirates’ trade; he should be punished if evidence can
be procured.”37
The official dragnet slowly closed in around Frederick Phillips as well. The letter
promised the inclusion of “a deposition of Humphrey Perkings as to the voyage of the
New York ship, owned by Colonel Depeyster, to Curaçoa. Perkings was master of the
ship Frederick, belonging to Frederick Phillips of New York and lately employed in
trading with pirates, and he is said to have been himself a pirate.” In other words, the
officials had brought in Humphrey Perkings, who provided a first-hand account of
Frederick Phillips’ piratical and illegal trading activities, which were almost viewed as
one in the same. Perhaps of greater and wider significance, it had become widely known
by this point that multiple North American colonies under British control knowingly
harbored and supported pirates. The Council of Trade and Plantations instructed
Bellomont to forward letters to Rhode Island and Connecticut so that they would cease
this laxity in policy.38
The letter forwarded by Governor Bellomont to Connecticut did not mince words
as British government officials from Whitehall saw the notable links between piracy and
trade involving a breach in the East India Company’s monopoly on the sale of goods
from the East Indies. It stated that “Many sorts of illegal trade have a great connection to
piracy, notably the connivance at the introduction of East India goods, piratically taken,
from Madagascar. The resistance to an attempt to seize such goods in Stanford in July
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last makes us believe that Connecticut is not wholly guiltless of this traffic.” Whitehall
had caught the Connecticut colonial administration perpetrating these acts. They expected
a swift and total correction of such behaviors.39
The letter forwarded by Governor Bellomont to Rhode Island also questioned
their true stance on piracy, including links to Madagascar, but no explicit mention of
trading in goods from the East Indies. The letter related “You send us copies of acts and
proclamations in defence of your conduct in relation to pirates, and seem to say that
Rhode Island has never countenanced with them, adding that William Mayes was cleared
from your Custom-house for Madagascar, with a lawful privateer’s commission.” The
Council expressed that they found this permissible, but wanted further documents to be
submitted for their review. This included commissions and bonds related to the creation
of recent privateers. They also pressed the Governor and other officials of Rhode Island
to continue their anti-piracy measures and to submit documents related to those measures
as well. Even though it had some tones of encouraging recent measures in relation to
piracy, the letter still hinted at distrust of the administration.40
As shown, piracy in the Indian Ocean upset the economics of the region in
primarily two ways. This occurred with pirate seizures of ships and through pirates
encouraging illicit forms of commerce. The routine of pirates preying upon shipping
served as the first and most apparent form of economic disruption. Pirates like Thomas
Tew and Captain Kidd gained large hauls of moveable wealth and goods from just taking
a single vessel. The emergence of a trans-oceanic system of illicit trade served as the
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second form of economic disruption brought on by piracy. American traders went to
Madagascar and its surrounding islands in order to buy slaves to sell in the English North
American colonies. Traders and ship owners made selling supplies and weapons to
pirates in and around Madagascar a big component of this trade however. Pirates would
of course pay them in whatever goods or wealth that they had on had, sometimes
resulting in captured East India goods being used as a means of currency in this
transaction. These would then be taken back to the English American colonies to be
traded, which the East India Company and English crown government held to be highly
illegal. Because of this emergence of an illicit and interloping trade in which pirates were
a key player that competed with the English East India Company, and the more blatant
losses of ships due to pirate attacks; the English East India Company and the crown
government highly sought means to bring down European and American pirate crews that
operated in the Indian Ocean. Officials began compiling documents and imploring
colonial governments to take a more stringent view towards any activities going on the
colonies that either did or could lead to aiding piracy.
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Chapter 2
Politics and Piracy

Piracy also played an influential role in the breakdown of political relations
between the British East India Company and the Mughal administration. Unfortunately
for the British East India Company, European and American piracy blighted not only
their shipping operations, but also those of the Mughal Emperor and his subjects. This
caused political and diplomatic problems to arise between both the English East India
Company and the Mughal Empire. The Mughals equated all Englishmen with pirates.
Thus, they blamed the English East India Company for significant losses incurred on
their shipping going from the western coast of India to the Red Sea. The ships going on
this journey to the Red Sea usually docked for trade and to give passage for pilgrims
participating in the Hajj, the pilgrimage journey established as an important tenant of
Islamic belief. Significant pirating instances occurred throughout the late-seventeenth
century. This chapter examines some instances of the 1680s, Henry Avery (1695), and
William Kidd (1698) and the political ramifications of their piracy, specifically in respect
to the Mughals. Interestingly the Mughal administration and its subjects exploited these
piratical situations to exercise more influence over Company operations. Most notably,
the Mughal administration required more convoy security to be provided by European
trading companies in general to indigenous shipping. This heavily implied that the
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presence of the English East India Company at this time depended largely on the
goodwill of the Mughal leadership. In addition, power relations between the two were at
least on more equal terms; or even more in the favor of the Mughals. Two worlds, the
ever-expanding European capitalist trading world and the traditional Islamic world, were
forced to interact in regards to the piracy problem. The Atlantic and the Indian Ocean
worlds clashed heatedly over this issue.
What did not help the British East India Company was the precedent it set in the
1680s with the policies implemented by Company head in India John Child. He
embarked on an intense crack down on interloper trading activity and, as historian John
Keay stated, treated such individuals like pirates by seizing their ships. This attitude
actually influenced some interlopers to turn to piracy because their occupation of trade
had been made untenable. This exercise of power over Indian Ocean waters also led to
emerging great expectations of the English East India Company to protect shipping from
pirates, like the Mughals did in the 1690s. At times, Child even targeted Mughal vessels
in a bid to impose greater control over the region. Rich takings shown from such actions
could have served as proof to potential European and American pirates that this region
served as a ripe site for plunder.41
The first instance up for examination is that of the “English” sea rovers that
victimized Mughal shipping in 1691 and 1692. These individuals were later found out to
be Danish seamen. This incident is intimated to historians by the account A Voyage to
Surat in the Year 1689. The chaplain and author of the work, J. Ovington, wrote this
account of his voyage and time in the East Indies. Like most accounts of this type, he
included commentaries on significant events that transpired during his travels. Notably,
41

Keay, The Honourable Company, 144, 172-178

34
and for the furtherance of this discussion, he mentioned piratical predations in the Indian
Ocean during the years 1691 and 1692 and mentioned how the Mughal Emperor and
administration reacted by punishing the British East India Company. The Mughals
perceived them to be the real culprits.42
J. Ovington opened his chapter dedicated to pirates and Surat by encountering the
British East India Company employees there as being under house arrest in their own
factory. In fact, all the European trading companies and related parties interested in
commerce were under heavy restrictions in their movement. This indicated that the
Mughals really didn’t know who had committed the recent piratical actions against them,
but special blame does seem to have befallen the English East India Company. Even
Ovington wrote that the Mughals had only known that Europeans, whom they called
“Hat-men,” had taken one of their ships. The travelling chaplain also wrote about the
imposed restrictions on August 27th, 1691; he reported that “All the English in the factory
of Suratt were under a close confinement from the Moors Governour of the city, and
surrounded with a guard of horse and foot. Nor were the French or Dutch permitted to
pass without the walls.”43
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Figure 2. “The Emperor Aurangzeb on Horseback,” Anonymous. Ca. 1690-1710.

In addition to the in-factory house arrest inflicted upon the English and the
detaining of the French and the Dutch within Surat’s city walls, the Mughals imposed
other requirements to atone for this action, such as payments. They expected large
monetary payments to assuage the damage incurred by the Mughals. Ovington wrote that
“‘till restitution is made by them [Europeans] of nine lacks of Roupies, which exceeds the
value of 1000.00 l. Sterling, no liberty must be granted.” Ovington specified the piratical
instance that took place, but in a rather critical tone to the Mughals. He related that the
Mughals had received a report that “a rich Moor-ship belonging to one Abdel Gherford
(Abdul Ghafar), was taken by Hat-men, that is, in their dialect, Europeans. The ship, in
her passage from Mocha to Surrat, and tho’ the Indians were averse from fighting, or
hazarding their lives for four roupies a month, yet the Turks, who had valuable cargo of
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goods on board, behav’d themselves with redoubted valour, ‘till after the loss of some of
their lives, they were overpower’d by men, and forc’d to surrender.” The pirates had
victimized a Mughal ship. Diplomatic fallout soon followed.44
Although at face value this passage in the account served as a report of events,
Ovington basically called Indians cowardly and reluctant to fight. This sentiment is
understandable at the time though. His own countrymen were facing persecutions at the
hands of the Indian Mughal administration. Such comments can also be seen as extending
to the Mughal leadership itself. He believed that such leadership had been acting unfair
and had actually exhibited cowardice as of late.45
Nonetheless, the Mughals demanded compensation and held the British East India
Company, the French, and the Dutch responsible for recent piratical predations. Ovington
highlighted and continued criticism of the Mughals for their behavior throughout this
affair. He related that the Mughals had two reasons for blaming the three European
parties. He believed that “because the Pirate shew’d both English, French, and Dutch
colours, a restitution was expected from them all.” This would be a very flimsy
reasoning, because pirates were well known for keeping a color locker, allowing them to
pick and choose which flag to run up the mast at any given time. Pirates and privateers
alike used colors to deceive their prey in order to pull them close in order to board them.
The other reason he believed for the Mughals blaming the European trading companies
for the pirate attack is because the victimized ship had sailed from “Surrat River” and had
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obtained special passes from these Europeans. In essense, the Europeans would have at
least minimal accountability.46
The British East India Company administration in Surat took immediate action to
redress the damages incurred by the Mughals, but not by simply giving in to all of their
demands. The English East India Company, according to Ovington, put up an unyielding
front and sought to have their employees released and for profitable trade to continue as
per usual. In order to do this, the Company President used a substantial amount of skillful
leverage against Abdul Ghafar to influence the Mughal governor in charge of
administering Surat to back down the offended party’s demands. Ovington related that:
Our Honourable President Bartholomew Harris made his defence to the
Governour after this manner. That the certainty of the fact, tho’ it might be
disputable, because our grand accuser Abdel Gherford had been found formerly
faulty in such a case, wherein he suborned a multitude of sailers, who afterwards
confest his bribery and their perjury; yet admitting it true, he thought it
unreasonable for us to be charg’d any more with the payment of money taken by
the Pirates at sea, than the Mughal for robberies on land.

Basically, Abdul Ghafar had acquired a history of unscrupulousness in legal matters
involving similar maritime cases. Intrinsically, President Harris argued that Ghafur’s
most recent accusation could not and should not be trusted.47
Regardless of Abdul Ghafar’s unscrupulousness, the Mughal governor of Surat
still needed adequate satisfaction because of the pirate attack. He no longer pressed them
for full monetary compensation for the loss of wealth and goods plundered from the ship.
He still sought satisfaction in some other more appropriate form however. As such, the
governor of Surat resolved to only take action “if it can be fairly prov’d, that the ship
belong’d to his [President Bartholomew Harris’] masters, the East-India Company.” As it
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turned out, personal interests leant tremendous additional help to the cause of the English
East India Company.48
J. Ovington related that the embargo on trade soon had noticeable damaging
political and economic effects on the Mughal administration itself. Retaliatory measures
directed at the Company hindered political maneuvering within the Mughal system for its
officials, particularly the Mughal governor of Surat. The governor “knowing that the
advancement of them was the great instrument of his promotion; and unable to
remonstrate any thing material to our Presidents reasons, directs a letter to AurengZebe...” The Mughal governor of Surat’s current position and possible advancement
depended on the customs revenue the Mughal administration tasked him to collect. This
being the case, he found incentive to help this trade with the English East India Company
begin again. This prompted him to write a letter for the advantage of the English East
India Company, asking for Emperor Aurangzeb to reassess the situation.49
The precise contents of the letter are not mentioned, but Ovington did provide a
rough synopsis: The Governor of Surat wrote a letter to Aurangzeb in favor of the
English East India Company. According to Ovington, the Mughal governor expressed,
“since the late wars the English merchants at Suratt have traded fairly and liv’d
peaceably; that much of the money due to the merchants upon the account of the wars
was already paid, and the rest would follow…” The Governor of Surat aimed to reaffirm
to the Mughal Emperor how in the recent past the English East India Company had been
operating in a way favorable to the Mughal administration. They had not disrupted the
peace during a time when other external enemies like the Maratha Confederacy stood in
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opposition.50 The Governor also reminded the Mughal Emperor of some apparent
reparatory payments the English East India Company had been paying, and he added that
they continued to do so. Also, and most importantly, the Governor of Surat discussed the
recent case of piracy in the Indian Ocean. He claimed that the English East India
Company could not be held responsible for this episode, to which he made a strong case
and directly stated his viewpoint. The Governor wrote that “for the Pirates at sea, they
were neither authoriz’d by the Company, nor were they within the reach of their
command: All which things might justly plead the innocence of the English, excuse their
payment of any money, and give them therefore a release.” The Governor argued that
they should not be held accountable and should be cleared of all allegations of piracy.51
Abdul Ghafar and the “Turks” continued to seek punishment for the English East
India Company employees at Surat with strict house arrest for the employees within the
factory. Ghafar wanted them confined, as Ovington put it; “not only to the walls of the
factory, but our very chambers.” President Harris did not let this happen, however. Still
disgruntled, the Mughals continued to try their best to persecute the English East India
Company employees. The Mughal Governor of Surat wielded his influence in favor of
the Company once again. He understood that President Harris and his employees would
not simply give in to this sort of abuse. The Governor soundly replied to these urgings
that “he knew Mr. Harris too well, to value any threatenings which were injurious to the
Company’s interest of honour; and that tho’ he suffer’d much, he would endure much
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more, rather than yield to an unjust compliance.” Continued abuse would simply be
pointless.52
This greatly dissatisfied the still unrecompensed Abdul Ghafar and Mughals
associated with his interests. By this point, the Mughal Governor of Surat made his
position in this matter physically known, in addition to his verbalized opinions. Ovington
related that the threat to the safety of the English East India Company factory employees
had reached an all-time high at this point. As such, the Governor prudently added to the
forces encircling the installation. The Governor “formerly set a guard upon us to shut us
in, now increases it to keep our enemies out.”53
Further indigenous aid came to wield its weight in favor of the British East India
Company. Ovington believed that this happened because of further infighting among the
Mughals, or “Turks” as he called them. They “began to clash among themselves, and
heated with some private dissentions, became their own accusers.” Ovington related that
some contacted a certain “Dungevora,” known as “a famous Persy merchant, and friend
to the English.” They did this in an attempt to upset the aims of those affiliated with the
Mughals that would benefit from the Company being persecuted. Those who had met
with “Dungevora” revealed to him what the persecutors of the Company had been up to
all along, that the “allegations against us were built upon falsehood and malice, and their
charge was all a contriv’d design.” They had been more than well aware that the pirates
in question had been Danish in origin and had exploited this for their own personal gain.

52
53

Ovington, A Voyage to Surat in the Year 1689, 413.
Ovington, A Voyage to Surat in the Year 1689, 414.

41
The persecutors “durst not discover to the Governour, for fear of a publick examination.”
If this happened, they feared that their lives might be made forfeit.54
Furthermore, in favor of the English East India Company, the Danes themselves
took accountability for this action. They had trading interests in the Indian subcontinent
as well and sought not to lose good favor. Ovington and the English East India Company
had heard from a couriered message from their solicitor that “the Mughal had news from
the Danes themselves, of their taking and plundering the Moor-ship.” In addition, the
Danes agreed to provide satisfactory recompense for this attack. The Danes had “resolv’d
upon a continued enmity to the Moors, ‘till their demands were fully satisfied for the
injuries which they formerly sustain’d from them.”55
This information made it to Emperor Aurangzeb in the form of a letter. In
response, the Emperor acted swiftly and reinstated English East India Company rights
and privileges regarding trade activities in Surat. Ovington’s summary of the letter
claimed that Aurangzeb demanded “a speedy respect and civility to the English, with a
permission and encouragement of trade.” The continuation of Company trade in Surat,
regardless of the Mughal Emperor’s order, remained at a halt. Infighting and personal
aggrandizement once again influenced events. This is because high-ranking individuals in
the Mughal administration contested with one another for the position of Governor of
Surat. The English East India Company suspended the expected giving of expensive gifts
to leaders involved in the reinstating of their privileges because the local power structure
happened to be in a period of relative turmoil.56
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The struggle for the Governorship of Surat involved enough high-ranking officials
to leave the Mughal Emperor unable to intervene effectively in the matter or instantly
resume trade. The struggle between officials within his administration actually hindered
him: “the strong contest and application for the Government of Suratt, which was then
said to be dispos’d of, put a stop to the Emperours more absolute determinations.” This
“Salabet Chan” sought a position for his son as Governor of Surat and to oust the current
Governor from that position. Not only did this serve as a power play in the Mughal power
hierarchy, but meant to make Salabet Chan and his son more favorable in the eyes of the
English East India Company. Ovington related this, saying that Salabet Chan “design’d to
send his son to Surrat, invested with the command of the city, and the messenger of this
welcome news to us, which would render him thereupon more acceptable to the English
nation, and would be apt to gain him some costly present from us at his entrance upon his
authority.” He planned to come to power and garner favor with the English.57
On December 3, 1691, the Mughal soldiers surrounding the English East India
Company factory at Surat complied with an order to withdraw. The employees were thus
released from house arrest within their installation. The following year of 1692 brought
its own troubles, however. In September of 1692, Ovington related to the reader of his
work that Abdul Ghafar, “our old implacable adversary,” brought to light another piracy
case. Ghafar happened to “revive his enmity, upon a report he forg’d, that some of his
ships from Mocha were seiz’d on by some English pirates; and upon this pretence,
secur’d us in our factory under a guard of Chokadars, ‘til the latter end of October.” The
Company experienced an annoying and disruptive repeat of the events of 1691. Abdul
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Ghafar once again claimed that the pirates who had attacked his ships were affiliated with
the Company. As such, he demanded just recompense for the damages he incurred.58
The acting Governor of Surat summoned the presidents of the English, French,
and Dutch trading companies with factories in Surat to address the recent attack on
indigenous shipping. The French president seems to have not even met with the Governor
after arguing with the Dutch president over “that precedence which they allow’d to the
English.” At the meeting, the Governor “insisted upon a restitution for the damages
which were sustain’d by Abdel-Gherford, and menac’d them with a prohibition of
traffick.” Ovington indicated that the English and Dutch presidents still present “told him
they were willing to relinquish, rather than be liable to the payment of such unjust
demands.” They were prepared to incur this consequence in order to preserve their honor
and for the practicality of not having to pay such a large sum.59
Abdul Ghafar’s plan to discredit the English East India Company ultimately failed
for a second time because it had been discovered that Ghafar had clandestinely hid
money in and around Surat. This money either had been paid by the English East India
Company possibly as normal customs dues, as payments from the Company meant to
recompense the troublesome ship owner, or maybe even money on board his ships that he
claimed had been stolen by pirates, but now needed hiding to make his case feasible.
Ovington’s document is unclear about the exact nature of the money Ghafar hid. What
the writer did convey is that “part of the money which he charg’d upon us, was coney’d
from on board his ship, into a garden near that of Nocha Damus’s by the river side. Four
thousand checkins he privately tied to the flooks of an anchor under water and some he
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hid within his tanques on board, and in the ballast of his ship.” He also supposedly tried
to use a pallaquin to smuggle a portion of this money through a city gate. The guards on
duty noticed something strange about the pallaquin and discovered the gold within.
Abdul Ghafar’s unscrupulous activities had been discovered and tied back to him again.
As a result, his case lost credibility and the English East India Company factory
employees at Surat were released from Mughal custody in November.60
These incidents in 1691 and 1692 show multiple possible conclusions. They
require analysis below the layer of being about a disgruntled Mughal official and ship
owner trying to cheat and steal money from the English East India Company for pirate
attacks they did not commit or have ties to. First, and most important, one can see how
these pirate attacks ultimately caused significant diplomatic and political fallout between
the English East India Company and the Mughal Empire. In fact, Europeans in and
around Surat as a whole received some measure of blame. They suffered persecution
meant to be administered until they paid the proper reparations deemed just for the pirate
attacks. These efforts of course were foiled because Abdul Ghafar had consistently been
found to have been untrustworthy and conniving.
Second, both instances revealed how the Mughal Empire wielded remarkable
amounts of power in these affairs. The English East India Company’s political and
diplomatic position proved to be tenuous, at best, in the face of overwhelmingly
significant land-based power centered around Emperor Aurangzeb and his administration,
regardless of the infighting that occurred. Each time Abdul Ghafar levied a charge, the
Mughals were able to send forces to surround the factory at Surat and force the occupants
into house arrest. President Harris and his administration put up a tough front, but both
60
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times found release from their predicaments only by outside events and blunders. They
could not marshal a response independently that would have made the Mughals back
down. Only Abdul Ghafar’s unscrupulous activities being discovered by other indigenous
players led to the Company being absolved of their accused crimes.
Third, the events of 1691 and 1692 reveal how piracy and the English East India
Company were seen as tools to be manipulated by the land-based Mughal elite. Abdul
Ghafar is belittled by Ovington in his work and is cast as a petty theft. The actual case,
however, showed how an indigenous interest attempted to wield power and influence to
get what it wanted. Ovington’s account portrayed how Abdul Ghafar deliberately used
instances of American and European piracy in the Indian Ocean to attempt to strong arm
the Company based at Surat for money and for a weakening of status. Ghafar is shown as
knowing that the Company had no affiliations to the attacks, but blamed them as part of a
scheme for self-promotion.
Henry Avery also decided to capitalize on the opportunity of riches by traversing
the waters between India and the Red Sea, in which he seized a prize Mughal vessel. He
initially entered the region mostly to plunder richly laden indigenous ships or whatever
he could get his hands on. Daniel Defoe in his A General History of the Pyrates discussed
Avery and his piratical career. He recounted where Avery and his crew went to the
“Arabian Coast; near the River Indus.” Here, they encountered a Dutch East-Indiaman
and decided to engage it. Defoe recounts that “she proved to be a better prize; when they
fired at her to bring to, she hoisted Mughal’s colours, and seemed to stand upon her
defence; Avery only cannonaded at a distance, and some of his men began to suspect that
he was not the hero they took him for.” The sloops sailing with Avery closed for a
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boarding action on the bow and the quarter of the targeted vessel. The enemy crew soon
after the boarding “immediately struck her colours and yielded.”61
Avery’s boarding parties were soon surprised by what sort of ship they had
seized: “She was one of the Great Mughal’s own ships, and there were in her several of
the greatest persons of his court, among whom it was said was one of his daughters, who
were going on a pilgrimage to Mecca.” High ranking officials and even a member of the
Mughal Emperor’s family had meant to go on the Hajj to Mecca, but had been raided by
Henry Avery. The status of the individuals on the ship meant that Avery had carried off
probably the largest heist of his career. Defoe stated that on board the travelers had “with
them all their slaves and attendants, their rich habits and jewels, with vessels of gold and
silver, and great sums of money to defray the charges of their journey by land; wherefore
the plunder got by this prize, is not easily computed.” After the plundering, Avery let the
ship go.62
News of Avery’s attack spread and gained notoriety. Sailor Edward Barlow wrote
years later that “one Everrey, a pirate, had taken one of the Mughal’s great ships and had
taken abundance of money out of her and what else they pleased, and had ravished a
great lady of the Court of the Great Mughal, who had been at Mocha to pay her devotions
to their prophet Mahomet’s tomb, and was aboard that ship in her return home.”63 Not
only Defoe’s work, but Barlow’s were circulated amongst a reading public. This meant
that such piratical events received large amounts of publicity and enhanced the
diplomatic fallout incurred by the English East India Company and the Crown
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government. Nevertheless, the Mughal Empire served as the Company’s main antagonist
to worry about.
Henry Avery’s predations also prompted the contemporary Indian historian Khafi
Khan to record the event in his histories. His account gave important and enlightening
details as well as provided a viewpoint from an educated Indian Muslim. He related that
the vessel had been in the process of returning to Surat on India’s western coast from
Mecca and Jedda. Passengers had taken passage to go on the Hajj, but trade goods had
been shipped out as well. Khan’s account, unlike that of Daniel Defoe, gave a rather
negative action report of the ship’s commander. Captain Ibrahim Khan had in his charge
a vessel with “eighty guns and four hundred muskets on board, besides other implements
of war.” The encounter with Henry Avery is compared with a cat espying a mouse.
Captain Khan would have seen an approaching ship of a “smaller size, and not having a
third or fourth part of the armament of the Ganj-i sawáí.”64
Nonetheless, tactics utilized by pirates: using swift craft and agile maneuvers in
the Caribbean against substantially larger vessels worked once again; this time in the East
Indies with Avery’s attack on the Ganj-I-Sawai. Khafi Khan recounted how the Mughal’s
ship fired one of its ship-mounted guns, but it exploded, killing some of the crewman
onboard. Avery’s men, called the “English” by Khafi Khan, fired a shot and damaged the
mainmast of the Mughal vessel. They then “bore down to attack, and drawing their
swords, jumped on board of their opponent.” The account then took on a near
propagandistically biased turn against Englishmen and Europeans in general, claiming
that they all lacked swordsmanship skills: “The Christians are not bold in the use of the
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sword, and there were so many weapons on board the royal vessel that if the captain had
made any resistance, they must have been defeated.” As such, Avery’s crew either had
numerical superiority and/or “presumably” a preponderance of firearms.65
The writer, in agreement with Daniel Defoe, then commented on Captain Ibrahim
Khan’s cowardly behavior. Khafi Khan related that the Mughal captain ran into the hold
and armed his Turkish women he had bought as concubines, which he now dressed as
men and sent against the pirate boarding parties. Avery’s crew soon captured them and
gained control of the ship. They took some of its contents and captives onto their own
ship. Then they beached the captured vessel and plundered its contents in a more
thorough manner.66
In lurid detail, Khafi wrote that the pirates “busied themselves for a week
searching for plunder, stripping the men, and dishonouring the women, both old and
young. They then left the ship, carrying off the men. Several honourable women, when
they found an opportunity, threw themselves into the sea, to preserve their chastity, and
some others killed themselves with knives and daggers.” This conjures up a vivid scene
of violent energy unleashed. Khafi Khan painted a picture where foreign barbarians
stripped ship passengers to search for hidden wealth. In addition, even the women had to
commit suicide to preserve their honor and purity, in order to avoid sexual assault and
rape basically.67
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The event referred to in Khafi Khan’s writings is the same event mentioned in
Defoe’s A General History of the Pyrates; the 1695 seizure of the Mughal ship Ganj-ISawai. This can be inferred by the travelers onboard, the inordinate richness of the cargo
and possessions, and of course the magnitude of the political and diplomatic
repercussions that this prompted from the Mughal Emperor. Emperor Aurangzeb (r.
1658- 1707) received news of this incident and vowed to take immediate action. Defoe
related “As soon as the news came to the Mughal, and he knew that they were English
who had robbed them, he threatened loud, and talked of sending a might army with fire
and sword, to extirpate the English from all their settlements on the Indian Coast.”
Needless to say, an intense political and diplomatic crisis had arisen between the English
East India Company and the Mughal Emperor.68
Fears of what Emperor Aurangzeb might do in response were expressed in the
English press. The English public were made aware of Avery’s activities in the Indian
Ocean, and writers expressed their fears as to what might happen to trade in the region
and to Europeans living abroad in India themselves. News trickled about a year after the
attacks as ships docked at harbors on the European continent and in the British Isles.
Publications around the year 1696 seemed to have scant information to provide the
public. One such publication, the London Gazette, wrote in late November of that year
about executions of “5 of the Pyrates of Every’s crew.” These men faced their deaths at
Execution Dock in London “for committing several pyracies upon the high seas…” This
article also revealed how readers knew some particulars of the attacks Avery and his crew
made upon indigenous shipping affiliated with the Mughal Empire. The article continued,
stating that not only were they being executed for piracy, but “particularly for taking and
68
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robbing two of the ships belonging to the subjects of the Great Mughal, bound to Surat
from Mocho in the Red Sea.”69
Another newspaper, the Post Man and the Historical Account, intimated in early
December of 1696 that a harsh punishment of some kind had befallen the Europeans
based in India and Company installations in the region. News had arrived in Cadiz,
Spain, and spread to the presses in London, where it then spread to the reading public. It
covered just a small portion of the page. Its contents were “By the ship Thomas put into
Cadiz from the East Indies we have an account, that the great Mughal, had used some
severities to the English there upon the account of the Pyracy committed by Avery, on his
subjects.” It is unclear, from this solitary source material, what exactly the “severities”
that had befallen the English consisted of.70 However, other sources filled in the paucity
of details.
The Mughal Emperor’s vows of wielding swift military force proved real in their
manifestations, but on only a slightly milder scale than before mentioned. Khafi Khan
provided a more detailed account of what happened. English factors based at the
Company factory installation in Surat offered a lump sum payment as compensation for
the incident. This proved unsatisfactory. Emperor Aurangzeb “ordered that the English
factors who were residing at Surat for commerce should be seized. Orders were also
given to I'timád Khán, superintendent of the port of Surat, and Sídí Yákút Khán, to make
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preparations for besieging the fort of Bombay.” He detained Company employees and
planned to assault a main base of operations for the Company in western India.71
Mariner Edward Barlow also recorded the consequences of the event. He
confirmed Khafi Khan’s account by stating:
all trade was stopped, and the English at Surat confined and kept prisoners, and
put to much trouble, for they said they [the Mughals] would have satisfaction for
their abuse and loss, and would suffer no trading with the English, and kept their
soldiers guarding all the English, not suffering them to go out of the factory, nor
to come to them, and kept them so several weeks till such time as they understood
the nature of pirates.

Barlow had heard about the house arrests imposed upon Company employees and of the
besieging of their factories. In addition, he heard how trade had reached a standstill. Even
though Barlow worked as a common sailor, all of these events would be of immense
importance to him since the Company employed him during this period.72
The English East India Company had recently improved the fortifications of their
installation at Bombay and took additional measures to protect themselves in case piracy
destabilized relations with the Mughals. Khafi Khan commented that the English
perceived Avery’s attack to be a particularly bad incident though. The English took more
cautionary measures. They “were more active than usual in building bastions and walls,
and in blocking up the roads, so that in the end they made the place quite impregnable.”
In addition, he personally observed that seemingly every able-bodied man had been
armed and accoutered for a possible defense. This could have also been merely for show.
He commented that the men were arranged as if on review. Itimad Khan, who the Mughal
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Emperor tasked along with Sidi Yakut Khan with besieging the Company installation at
Bombay, decided on a less harsh course of action. This is due to his concerns about the
potential loss of English East India Company customs revenue payments. Historian Khafi
Khan related that “I'timád Khán saw all these preparations, and came to the conclusion
that there was no remedy, and that a struggle with the English would result only in a
heavy loss to the customs revenue.”73
A siege did not occur, and the tension and anger between both sides became a
standoff. Each took hostages from their respective competitors: “To save appearances, he
[Itimad Khan] kept the English factors in confinement, but privately he endeavoured to
effect an arrangement. After the confinement of their factors, the English, by way of
reprisal, seized upon every Imperial officer, wherever they found one, on sea or on shore,
and kept them all in confinement. So matters went on for a long time.”74 This matter had
international diplomatic and political implications. Even so, the Company administration
in London soon found a way to diffuse the situation. Defoe wrote that “The East-India
Company in England, were very much alarmed at it; however, by degrees, they found
means to pacify him, by promising to do their endeavours to take the robbers, and deliver
them into his hands; however, the great noise this thing made in Europe, as well as India,
was the occasion of all these romantick stories which were formed of Avery’s
greatness.”75
In this manner, the English East India Company had bought itself peace for the
moment. Emperor Aurangzeb had not ousted the Honourable Company and allowed it to
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remain on India’s western coast. A potential war between the two factions had been
avoided. The Company’s self-proclaimed position as thlasso-hegemon for the Indian
Ocean had been called into question. Aurangzeb and other indigenous parties realized the
hypocrisy in having such a force in the area and simultaneously having insecure shipping
lanes. The Mughal and related interested parties used this to their advantage and
demanded that the Company and other European trading companies take on convoy
duties to escort trade and pilgrimage ships travelling from India to the Red Sea. This, by
all means, did not mean the end of such piratical acts in the East Indies as later episodes
have shown. The 1695 episode also served Henry Avery as well. It had gave him a large
reputational boost for the uproar he had caused. One large seizure had made him near
infamous.
Another notable and lasting outcome in the diplomatic and political arena of
Henry Avery’s piracy in 1695 is that it further ingrained preconceived Indian notions of
the English East India Company taking active part in piracy. It led to the furtherance of
this stereotype. Mughal historian Khafi Khan near the end of his account regarding this
event related this very viewpoint. He provided a negative discourse towards Company
activities in the region of western India. He claimed that the English settlement at
Bombay required piracy in order to stay financially stable. To do so, he claimed they
would systematically seize Mughal shipping; “one or two every year.” They supposedly
had carefully gathered intelligence on which ships had the richest cargoes and laid in wait
when they returned from the Red Sea. He claimed that “When the ships are proceeding to
the ports of Mocha and Jedda laden with the goods of Hindústán, they do not interfere
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with them; but when they return bringing gold and silver and Ibráhímí and ríál,* their
spies have found out which ship bears the richest burden, and they attack it.” 76
Khafi Khan continued his discourse with a comparison and contrasting of the
English East India Company to indigenous bands of pirates. He wrote that there existed
in the vicinity of Bombay: “The Marathas also possess the newly-built forts of Khanderí,
Kalába, Kása, and Katora,* in the sea opposite the island fortress belonging to
the Habshís. Their war-ships cruise about these forts, and attack vessels whenever they
get the opportunity. The sakanas also, who are sometimes called bawáríl, a lawless set of
men belonging to Surat, in the province of Ahmadábád, are notorious for their piracies,
and they attack from time to time the small ships which come from Bandar 'Abbásí and
Maskat.” So there existed pirates affiliated with the Marathas and the pirates called the
Sakanas/Bawaril. These pirate groups were used in a notable contrast when he claimed
“They do not venture to attack the large ships which carry the pilgrims.” So even these
pirates, he expressed, at least had the decency not to attack Islamic pilgrimage ships. He
expressed how the English and perceivably Company had been especially deviant and
malicious in supposedly committing and allowing such attacks to occur. He then
strangely made a comparison, claiming that “The reprobate English act in the same way
as the sakanas.”77
There is even proof of Avery’s predations and related piratical instances being
perceived as disastrous to Britain’s position in international politics. Governor of West
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Jersey, Jeremiah Basse, wrote a letter to William Popple, a London merchant and
secretary of the Board of Trade, dated July 18, 1697, London. Basse wrote:
You cannot be insensible of the dishonour as well as damage suffered by this
nation through the increase of piracies under the banner of England in any part of
the world. The depredations of Avery [Every] on the coasts of India and Arabia
have come under your cognisance, but I believe that you have not been informed
of the increase of pirates on those coasts caused by the expectations of great
riches there, and perhaps too much by the connivance of those who ought to have
suppressed them. The Colonies in the Islands and Main of America have not a
little contributed to this increase.78

In this letter, Jeremiah Basse used the figure of Henry Avery as a well known pirate in
order to talk about other piratical acts and colonial injustices involved in propagating
piracy. As such, Avery is seen as continuing an ongoing trend. Figures such as Avery
brought “dishonour” upon the Crown government, making the government lose face in
the realm of international politics. Measures thus needed to be taken to limit and suppress
such activities for the Crown government to regain reputation.79
Raids on Mughal shipping, like those of Avery, continued and once again upset
politics and diplomatic relations between the Mughal Empire and the British East India
Company. Bizarrely, English measures to limit pirate attacks on Mughal shipping
actually invited another momentous vessel seizure to take place in 1698. Captain William
Kidd had been commissioned by the Governor of New York to act as a privateer and to
hunt pirates for the English Crown government in the Indian Ocean.80 The poor pickings
soon supposedly led his crew to grow desperate. Nevertheless, an attack occurred and
once again caused a falling out between the Company and the Mughals.
78

J.W. Fortescue., ed. Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 15
May, 1696- 31 October, 1697 (London: Mackie and Co. LD., 1904), 557.
79
Fortescue, . Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 15 May, 169631 October, 1697, 557.
80
Ritchie, Captain Kidd and the War Against the Pirates, 50-55.

56
To protect the trade of their sanctioned East India Company, the English Crown
government sanctioned privateering. Governments in the English North American
colonies also began to fit out privateers, but to serve their more localized needs.
Conveniently enough for him, around this time the English North American colony of
New York found itself taking immense damage from a military conflict with the French
and faced dire economic straits.81 In these circumstances, the issuing of letters of marque
or “commissions,” as the sources called them, served as a common way to mobilize
civilian sea forces in a manner both quick and more cost saving for governments.

Figure 3 (Left) “Captain William Kidd.” Anonymous.; Figure 4 (Right)- “Captain Henry Avery.”
Anonymous.
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To suppress piracy, the English Crown put the job to those able to provide the
appropriate services. Richard Bellomont, the Governor of New York, claimed the job,
and with the help of other notables created a joint-stock venture in which they provided
the funds to fit out a ship as an armed vessel for anti-piracy and anti-French shipping
operations in the Indian Ocean. The Governor of New York offered Captain William
Kidd the position as leader of the expedition. He and his crew had the potential to reap
large profits from whatever ships they could board and plunder, as laid out in the
commission. He would, of course, be allowed to keep a substantial part of the profits for
himself and for those who had invested in the venture.82
Defoe’s General History of the Pyrates and historians have suggested that
Captain William Kidd appeared to have had a change of heart upon entering the Red Sea
during his East Indies cruise. His luck had up to this point been nearly non-existent in
finding any substantial takings at sea. Because of this, Kidd either reasoned
independently or had been influenced by his crew to expand his list of targetable seagoing vessels. His privateering commission explicitly laid out that he could solely target
vessels belonging to the French or those that had turned pirate. So when he sailed the Red
Sea, Kidd decided to breach the predetermined terms of his commission and tried to
attack a European-Mughal shipping convoy. The convoy shows how European trading
companies in the East Indies had been sticking to the Mughal Emperor’s terms of
increased shipping security; an English and a Dutch ship had been acting as part of an
armed escort for an indigenous trading vessel. Kidd attacked this convoy, beginning what
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his financial and political backers would have seen as a descent into piracy. He had
turned to the black flag.83
The judicial examination of Edward Buckmaster and the account of Captain
Edward Barlow both shed light on Captain Kidd’s first instance of piracy. Edward
Buckmaster, a crewman under Kidd’s command during this incident, confirmed in his
June 6, 1699 examination the fact that the attack occurred on a convoy of European and
Mughal shipping. Buckmaster claimed that he, Kidd, and the Adventure Galley were in
the Red Sea. There they “met with several ships, some with English, some with Dutch,
and some with Moors colours, with whom they sailed in company for twenty five days
but were not on board any of them. That the name of the one was the Scepter, which ship
fired a gun or two at Capt. Kidd’s galley.”84
Edward Barlow served as acting Captain on the Scepter during a skirmish with
William Kidd in the Red Sea, basically taking part in Kidd’s first partial foray into
piracy. The former captain had died shortly before the attack. Barlow took command of
the Scepter and oversaw the obligation of providing English protection of indigenous
Mughal shipping while it transited the Red Sea. He wrote of the encounter on August 15,
1697, that “in the morning betimes we espied a ship more than our company, almost
gotten into the middle of our fleet.” Barlow noted the strange behavior of the ship. It kept
its distance and showed little signs of identification. Specifically, Barlow noted that “He
showed no colours, but came jogging on with his courses hauled up, under two topsails,
having more sails furled than usually ships carry, namely a mizen topgallantsail and a
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spritsail topgallantsail, which made us judge presently what he was, he coming pretty
near us but scarce within shot.”85
As the two ships got closer to one another, Barlow managed to get a good look.
He observed and called it “a pretty frigate-built ship, as we understood afterward built at
Deptford, called the Adventure Galley; she carrying about twenty-eight or thirty guns,
having on her lower gun deck a tier of ports for oars to row withall in calm weather. She
showed no colours but had only a red broad pennant out without any cross on it.” Barlow
had been to the East Indies multiple times before and had many years of experience as a
seaman. He decided to employ patience to deter what he had quickly concluded was a
pirate vessel.86
Captain Kidd and Captain Barlow both used deception here. Barlow waited for
the right moment to fire. He reported “And seeing the pirate as near as he intended to
come, being almost abreast of us, we presently hoisted our colours and let fly two or three
guns at him well shotted; and presently got both out boats ahead, having very little wind,
towing towards him.” Barlow had successfully drawn Kidd towards him and opened fire.
He sent out the ship’s boats for the purpose of pursuit. They pulled the Scepter towards
the belligerent since no wind blew to give them the normal mode of movement.87
The Adventure Galley throughout this engagement definitely retained the
advantage in terms of mobility. Having “oars to row withall in calm weather,” Kidd could
persistently avoid his enemies, like Barlow and the Scepter, and choose his targets. He
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could move regardless of the direction and presence of a wind. He now turned his
attention to the Mughal shipping. The Adventure Galley “fired four or five times at one of
the Moors’ ships, striking him in the hull and through his sails.” This did not compel the
victimized ship to give up and consent to boarding. Even if it had, the Scepter still served
as an active asset and hotly pursued Captain Kidd as best as Captain Barlow could
manage. Barlow attested to this fact, claiming that “seeing us make what we could
towards him [Kidd], he presently made what sail he could from us, getting out his oars
and rowing and sailing, we firing what we could at him.”88
Captain Kidd, failing to capture any of the ships he had fired upon, still played
upon the convoy from a distance with cannon fire. Barlow traded fire back and forth with
Kidd, but did not inflict any substantial damage or seem to persuade Kidd to sail away
and leave the local waters completely for the time being. Once again, Kidd’s superior
mobility proved to be a key advantage in eluding the Scepter. Barlow commented “We
fired at him as long as he was anything near, and judged did hit him with some of our
shot; but he sailed far better than we did, and being got out of shot of us, he took in his
oars and his small sails, hauling up his lower sails in the brails, staying for us.”89
Captain Barlow pursued as best as he could with the Scepter until Kidd eventually
gave up the fight and fully withdrew. Kidd “being frustrated in his design, and then
seeing a good convoy along with the Moors’ ships, made sail for the coast of India.” By
the morning of August 16, no one sighted him. Barlow had saved his convoy from this
pirate crew to the hearty thanks of the “Moors’ ships.” He knew his duty to protect the
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convoy and what exactly had been at stake for the Europeans trading in India, particularly
the English East India Company. He knew about how the Mughals had cracked down on
Company installations like that of Surat due to past pirate attacks on their shipping. He
directly mentioned the consequences he knew would have happened if he had failed:
“had any of the ships miscarried or been robbed by the pirate, all English would have
been confined again at Surat close prisoners.” His sense of foreboding is rather poignant,
given that shortly after this encounter with William Kidd, the pirate would cause another
similar crisis for the Company.90
Kidd had not yet technically committed an act of piracy, but had basically turned
to that career path. He had not boarded and seized a vessel belonging to an entity not
sanctioned as a target by his privateering commission. However, he had attempted to
commit a piratical act. The intent existed. His ship, the Adventure Galley, had fired upon
ships affiliated with the English East India Company and the Mughal Empire. He had
officially cast his lot with piracy. After the events that took place in the Red Sea, he did
manage to make small seizures of goods and supplies, not significant scores. He did take
a Dutch ship, the Rupparell, mistaking it for a Mughal vessel because indigenous
crewman called lascars manned it. Kidd sold the goods in Caliquilon to an unscrupulous
Company employee named Gillam Gandaman. In 1698, however, Kidd finally got the
opportunity he had been waiting for, executed an attack, and captured a rich haul that
would cause political and diplomatic hardship for the Company.91
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Captain William Kidd continued on this path of plundering the Malabar Coast, on
the western side of the Indian subcontinent, leading to the seizure of the Quedah
Merchant and further breakdown in Mughal- English East India Company relations. Kidd
continued to be opportunistic in his takings. Then, in 1698, roughly three years after the
diplomatically disruptive Henry Avery raid on the Ganj-i-Sawai, Captain Kidd and his
crew took their largest and most politically and diplomatically influential vessel of their
seaborne careers: the Quedah Merchant. Captain Kidd and his crew were sailing their
ship, the Adventure Galley, in the waters of Arabian Sea near the southwestern coast of
India. During this, they happened to espy a possible target, the first in months. They took
this indigenous-looking ship and plundered it. Estimates of its worth ranged between
200,000 to 400,000 rupees, or approximately £30,000.92 This once again led the Mughal
Emperor Aurangzeb to react angrily to the English East India Company.
Similar to his 1695 response to Avery, Aurangzeb enforced terms of house arrest,
indemnities, and compensatory payments for losses on the English East India Company
based at Surat. This of course led the Company factors there to dislike Captain Kidd.
Once again, they were confined within their own premises, and trade had been brought
effectively to a halt. Unluckily for the Company, the victim happened to be the Quedah
Merchant. The vessel had been financially backed by the connected and influential
Mughal merchant Muklis Khan. Once again, the Mughal Emperor punished the Company
and expected more assistance from them to protect his shipping and that of his subjects.93
The contemporary newspaper sources available are vague about the consequences
of William Kidd’s piratical act, but intimate that the fate of Company factors had spread
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to Europe. Kidd’s name is not mentioned specifically as the perpetrator. However,
disruptions in trade are made apparent as the Company faced blame for recent Mughal
shipping losses due to piracy in the region around the time of Kidd’s seizure of the
Quedah Merchant. An edition of the Post Man and the Historical Account in mid-1699
claimed that letters had arrived in Amsterdam relating what had happened. It claimed that
the Dutch had made a favorable deal with the Mughal Governor of Surat, to which in
response the Mughal Governor released back Indian servants to them. In addition, “the
chief guard, that had been posted to hinder the Europeans from trading, were already
removed, so that it was not doubted but that the English and French, would also
accommodate the difference with the Mughal.”94
Some event, probably a pirate attack as per usual, most likely that of William
Kidd, prompted the Mughal Governor of Surat to halt trade. As usual, European trading
entities like the English East India Company were held liable. The Company had been
surrounded within their factory until amends had been made. The fact that the Mughal
troops had been instructed to stand down indicated that the French and British had at least
made indications that they would or had already made some sort of first amends. As such,
Kidd proved to be a menace to even normal Company operations on India’s western
coast, along with damaging relations between the Mughal and the Company.
Another newspaper, the London Post with Intelligence Foreign and Domestick,
indicated that even the highest affairs of diplomacy in India had been compromised, or at
least influenced in a negative way as the English East India Company would have seen it.
In 1699, King William III of England sent Sir William Norris as an ambassador to meet
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with Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb. This happened amidst a period where Parliament had
deregulated monopolistic trade with the East Indies. For a while, most anyone could trade
with India. Thus, a new rival East India Company formed, labelled as the New East India
Company by historians. This found fervent opposition from the original Old East India
Company. Sir William Norris had been sent by the King of England to vouch for the
interests of the New Company.95
The newspaper article related that the captain of the Scarborough arrived in Surat.
He represented the New East India Company and reassured the Governor of Surat that the
New Company would respect indigenous interests. In addition, the captain told the
governor that ambassador Sir William Norris would soon meet with the Mughal
Emperor. The King of England, according to this spokesman, planned to send “a great
squadron of men of war, in order to give chase to the pirates who had done so much
damage to the subjects of the great Mughal, and that the old Company itself had some
share in that mischief.” The New Company attempted to defame the Old Company by
blaming them for piracy in the region. The captain of the Scarborough offered the New
Company as a more favorable alternative. It purportedly would be the one to finally
cleanse the seas of the piracy menace that had plagued Mughal shipping for so long. 96
It is through this newspaper article that readers can also learn how the Company
employees were harshly treated in the face of Kidd’s recent attack. The author of the
article seems to claim that the captain of the Scarborough proved so persuasive that
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employees of the Old Company were persecuted for piracy. Even so, the article itself
even conceded that “these and several other reasons in prejudice of the said Company,
moved their Governour.” Most likely due to the combined entreaties of the Scarborough
captain and the fairly recent attack of William Kidd on the Quedah Merchant, the
Governor of Surat decided “to take all their factors into custody, and to secure all their
effects, in order to pay their debts they owe here out of the same.” Like with the attacks
of 1691 and 1692 that Ovington mentioned, Henry Avery, and others, the factors were
arrested.97
Luckily for the Old East India Company, things went back to normal when they
made reparatory payments to the Mughal Governor of Surat. An article from 1701 related
just that, stating that “The Old English East-India Company, have made up a new
difference with the Moorish governour, upon account of the loss that the inhabitants have
sustained these 4 years past, by pirates, with a good sum of money.” After making this
form of reparatory payment, trading affairs again went relatively back to normal.
Although this proved true between the Mughal imperial administration and the Old East
India Company, new problems were quickly being made apparent. The New East India
Company soon gained traction in the region, particularly in Surat. The article related that
“the New Company is busy erecting factories, and magazines, which will cost them
100,000 rupies.” The presence of this trading entity of course led to heated competition.
This led to the article observing that “Both the English companies are hurtful to each
other, and have frequent jarrings.”98
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As for the Sir William Norris embassy to Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb, his
attempt to obtain favorable concessions for the New East India Company amounted to
basically nothing. After a reportedly arduous and frustrating venture, Norris finally
secured an audience with Emperor Aurangzeb. He produced gifts to the ruler and began
negotiations. This lasted for a period of six months. A letter from Thomas Pitt of the Old
East India Company administration in India to Mr. Robert Raworth intimated that, by
October 1701, affairs had not made much progress.99
Norris’ superiors were displeased with this lack of progress, for which recent
piracy in the region could be properly blamed. Pitt wrote that “Your Ambassadour
[Norris] is at the camp eating rice and curry at the King’s charge, and notwithstanding the
vast expense he has been at we do not hear he has effected any thing, nor will they I
believe part with him till they have suck’d him dry.” Pitt viewed current proceedings in a
very negative light and believed that the diplomatic mission would end with a net loss.
Events soon proved him right. Once again, the emperor proved obstinate in regards to
pirates preying upon his shipping. Aurangzeb, in the end, could not be swayed by Norris’
entreaties and left basically empty handed in terms of concessions for the New East India
Company. European and American pirate attacks had influenced even the highest levels
of political and diplomatic discourse between King William III of England, in association
with the interests of the New East India Company, and the Great Mughal Emperor
Aurangzeb.100
To end this chapter, European and American pirates had serious ramifications on
politics and diplomacy in the Indian Ocean region. This particularly can be seen in
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relations between the English East India Company and the Mughal Empire. The Mughal
administration would shut down Company trading activity and hold them responsible for
these attacks. As such, they would usually be required to make the necessary reparatory
payments to prominent Mughal-affiliated merchants and ship owners. Four major attacks
in particular shook regional affairs in this manner. They were the attacks by pirates in
1691 and 1692 that Ovington mentioned, Henry Avery’s seizure of the Ganj-I-Sawai in
1695, and Captain Kidd’s seizure of the Quedah Merchant in 1698.
Throughout all of these instances, a clash between the worlds of the Atlantic
Ocean and the Indian Ocean occurred. Indigenous forces like the Mughal administration
and those affiliated with it wielded remarkable amounts of influence upon and against the
English East India Company. The trading company managed to come out of all of these
trials, but usually at the cost of making payments. They and other European trading
companies, in addition, had to concede to providing ever greater obligations to convoy
security. Even when the trading companies provided this, pirates still proved to be a
problem. Edward Barlow, taking part in this duty, encountered Captain Kidd in the Red
Sea as late as 1697. More substantial physical manifestations of royal and Company
power would have to be made manifest before piracy would be put into seriously dire
straits.
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Chapter 3
Society and Piracy

European and American pirates proved impactful in terms of social conditions in
the Indian Ocean region. This is particularly made apparent on Madagascar and its
surrounding islands. Madagascar existed as a laboratory for the implementation of
enlightenment ideas regarding individual rights and proper, egalitarian government and
society. There perhaps existed a pirate republic called Libertalia, but this seems doubtful.
Pirates there supposedly implemented utopianism, valued egalitarianism, and destroyed
class and property boundaries that existed in Europe in this period. There did at least exist
individual settlements where like ideas found implementation. The idea of pirates settling
in the region and forming more egalitarian counter-cultural entities happened to be true,
but not in all cases. There are multiple cases where pirates who landed on Madagascar or
its satellite islands merely grafted themselves into preexisting monarchical governmental
systems. They provided valuable service to indigenous kings and princes and, through
merit, worked their way up the hierarchy. Then, they became kings, princes, or officials
in their own right. Here, one can see that these pirates made choices based on
circumstance whether to apply the more deviatory European ideas of the time produced
by the enlightenment, or adhere to the familiar system of monarchy for personal gain.
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Pirate crews on board their respective vessels notably applied a looser, more
egalitarian framework to hierarchy and codes of conduct. This is because many pirates
had formerly been in the merchant marine or the Royal Navy. Both of these institutions
were notorious for the brutal conditions imposed by overbearing officers and the
everyday ardors of working at sea. This encouraged ordinary seamen to turn to a life of
piracy. In their new lives, they adopted a much more relaxed command structure and
mode of operations. They applied enlightenment principles that ensured egalitarianism
and rights. All crewman had a measure of power through enfranchisement. They voted on
who would serve as Captain, but the individual who occupied this spot held little power.
Crewmen could challenge his authority in most instances that did not constitute combat
and pursuit of vessels. In effect, pirates heavily believed in the enlightenment principles
of popular sovereignty and social contract. Unpopular captains could be removed from
command and replaced with a potentially more favorable candidate.101
Pirate crews also drew up their own governing documents and had a governing
structure of holding councils. They created their own articles and rules. These established
such things as appropriate shipborne codes of conduct, systems of authority, and the
distribution of plunder. There also existed among many crews an established system of
compensation for injuries. This acted as a sort of insurance system where crewmen
received certain amounts of money for certain injuries. Crews also had their own
councils. These councils guaranteed equal representation in crucial matters that affected
the livelihood of the crew.102
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The crew had power as the “people” while the captain served as the “ruler,” ruling
at the continued behest of his crew. The sheer amount of power ordinary crewmen
wielded can be seen with the case of Captain Mackra, commanding an English ship in the
Indian Ocean around the year 1720. Like many ships transiting the region, they stopped
at an island near Madagascar called Johanna for supplies. Such a stop served as an
opportunity to resupply and spend time on dry land before going back to sea. Captain
Mackra and his crew heard of a small group of pirates at the Bay of Johanna and decided
to sail there to root it out. He and Captain Kirby had concluded that “it might be of great
service to the East-India Company to destroy such a nest of rogues.”103
So Captain Mackra sailed onwards, accompanied by another English ship under
Captain Kirby and a Dutch East Indiaman, to the Bay of Johanna. There they encountered
two pirate vessels, both containing approximately 30 guns. Mackra proceeded to engage
the pirates, but Kirby kept his vessel from getting into the engagement. The Dutch East
Indiaman followed suit. Mackra seemed understandably indignant, “both he [Captain
Kirby] and the Ostender basely deserted us, and left us engage with barbarous and
inhuman enemies, with their black and bloody flags hanging over us, without the least
appearance of escaping being cut to pieces.”104
Mackra held his ground and fought on against now oppressive odds. He did not,
as he previously believed, get “cut to pieces.” He explained: “But God, in his providence,
determin’d otherwise; for notwithstanding their superiority, we engag’d them both about
three hours, during which, the biggest received some shot betwixt wind and water, which
made her keep off a little to stop her leaks. The other endevoured all she could to board
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us, by rowing with her oars, being within half a ships length of us above an hour; but by
good fortune we shot all her oars to pieces, which prevented them, and by consequence
saved our lives.” Captain Mackra had survived the hot engagement so far, but many of
his crewmen lay wounded on the deck. The larger of the two pirate vessels still attempted
to fight the English vessel. Captain Mackra concluded that the best option lay in going
ashore. He had his crew continue to fire upon the pirates. With casualties mounting, the
need to abandon ship became more apparent: “my men being killed and wounded, and no
hopes left us from being all murdered by enraged barbarous conquerors, I order’d all that
could, to get to the long-boat under the cover of the smoak of our guns; so that with what
some did in boats, and others by swimming, most of us, that were able, got ashore by
seven a-clock.”105
After this engagement, Captain Mackra wrote that he had tried to elude the pirates
for a time. He ended up in their custody, however, “Having obtained leave to go on board
the pyrates, and a promise of safety, several of the chief of them knew me, and some of
them had sailed with me, which I found of great advantage; because, notwithstanding
their promise, some of them would have cut me, and all that would not enter with them,
to pieces, had it not been for the chief Captain, Edward England, and others I knew.”
Mackra had fallen in with pirate Captain Edward England, but even this great pirate
captain commanded only at the behest of his crew. Captain England took favor regarding
Captain Mackra’s interests. This captive situation apparently caused a rift to form
between him and those he served with. This proved so severe that the crew marooned
both Mackra and England on Mauritius. This episode, Captain Mackra’s attack on ships
at Johanna, his capture, and marooning, all show how powerful the voice of a pirate crew
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could be in opposing their captain. They could leave him marooned on an island for not
respecting their wishes.106
Because of these strong systems of pirate governance already preexisting at sea, it
is not by any means surprising that they carried over when crews hit land and settled.
Such systems prevailed whether the duration consisted of short term or long term stays.
Governance and social structure based on the Captain-crew social contract and articles
survived with the establishment of settlements. Although this later section of Defoe’s
work is held to be highly questionable, it recorded Captain Mission and Captain Thomas
Tew as examples of pirates who took upon themselves the task of creating pirate
settlements on and around Madagascar. This at least reflected the reality that pirates at
least settled on Madagascar. Mission apparently established a proper settlement on
Madagascar, and Tew later decided to join him in this venture. This source cited Tew’s
seizure of “a ship belonging to the Great Mughal” as being a large reason why he came to
Mission’s colony and “Libertalia” in the first place. After arrival, the account claims they
turned their attentions to actual settlement. They erected defensive batteries and took to
farming and raising livestock. They then made laws and formed their own system of
government with commonly agreed upon laws and their own hierarchy. Property rights
were established, allowing equal distribution and for people to stake out their own claims.
Captain Mission became the elected leader, known as the “Lord Conservator.” Captain
Tew became an “Admiral.”107
Although this account is largely held to be fictional, pirate crews did operate
along these more egalitarian lines and applied these ideologies onboard their vessels and
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on land. And even so, the representative value of Libertalia itself is almost as important
as whether or not this precise pirate republic existed. A wide reading public would have
read Defoe’s work and been exposed to enlightenment ideas and seen their application as
exhibited by this pirate community. More realistic examples of pirates living on
Madagascar are recorded. Commodore Upton received news from the French at
Pondicherry that the pirates were “strong in the Indian seas, having 11 sail and 1500 men,
but that many of them went away about that time [June 1721], for the Coast of Brazil and
Guinea; others settled and fortified themselves at Madagascar, Mauritius, Johanna and
Mohilla.” In addition, a specific group of pirates after taking “a large Moor vessel” then
“divided the plunder, burnt their ship and prize, and sat down quietly with their other
friends at Madagascar.”108
It should also be mentioned that a sizeable portion of these crews also contested
dominant social systems at this time not just by employing social ideas theorized by
enlightenment thinkers, but by also grafting themselves into preexisting monarchical
systems. Daniel Defoe described a Madagascar that happened to be in near constant
political flux as indigenous Malagasy princes competed with one another for power in
military conflicts. Pirates arrived on the scene and proved to be highly desired mercenary
auxiliaries to these local rulers. They had gunpowder weapons that gave a vast advantage
to patron rulers. Through this service, they earned prestige, captives, and wealth. When
natives themselves began to threaten the pirates, the pirates began to establish their own
political entities.109
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Like in West Africa, these essentially socially deviant Europeans exploited
internal conflict between native Malagasy princes for the captives generated by war.
Pirate hunter Woodes Rogers later visited Madagascar and showed pirates as not living
like revolutionary republicans, but as relatively new monarchs. Reportedly, some pirates
he encountered had been there for 25 years. They had established large families from
unions with native wives and lived like princes from their adopted culture, wearing
animal skin garments. To support themselves and their newly acquired states, Defoe
related that they sold their own Malagasy subjects as captives for trade goods, but these
also could have been war captives. Pirates had essentially coopted a monarchical system
to bring themselves to a prominent social position. Defoe commented that “Thus Tyrant
like they lived, fearing and feared by all.”110
Quite possibly, pirates possibly engaged in a blend of these two modes as well. If
the accuracy of a print of Henry Avery from around the early-eighteenth century can be
trusted, one can see both evidences of settlement and the usage of black slavery, negating
the idea that pirate egalitarian societal values had been applied in full on Madagascar.
The print shows Henry Avery out on a stroll carrying a musket shouldered as if in
marching order. An indigenous Malagasy is holding a parasol over him though. Avery is
shown inflicting a highly servile role upon one of the natives. Also of note, one sees a
fortress in the background. Flying atop the battlements is a black flag with crossed bones.
This is a blatant depiction of an established pirate fortress.
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Figure 5- “Henry Every [Avery].” Anonymous.

Pirates challenged predominant social hierarchical systems of the day by
employing enlightenment ideas such as egalitarianism and the social contract and others.
This can be seen in the account of Libertalia, which, although quite possibly untrue, at
least represents the reality of pirate settlement on Madagascar and existed as another
source of literature that displayed such thought to an English reading public. Pirates also
challenged dominant European social hierarchical systems by earning their way to the top
of indigenous social hierarchies. They had, in the eyes of European systems, unjustly
become leaders and rulers. This latter idea clashes with historians such as Marcus
Rediker, who maintained that pirates and African slaves would have had more in
common since they both found oppression by harsh naval captains and officers that
represented unforgiving land-based European social systems. Sailors, he claimed, found
unity through work and similar living conditions.111 The is not the case, however. Sources
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clearly point out that pirates became native princes in their own right and sold either their
subjects or captives from wartime as slaves with little compunction in order to get trade
goods.
The piracy conducted on the Pirate Round, of course, did not go unnoticed by the
English East India Company and the English Crown that granted them their patronage.
Royal officials noticed that many pirates were from North America and had received
reports that they returned from pirating voyages in the Indian Ocean and received safehaven in English North American and Caribbean colonies. Because of the economic,
political, and social effects of piracy in the Indian Ocean; the English East India
Company and its supporting crown government began to pay more attention to this issue.
They would no longer tolerate illicit ship seizures and illicit forms of commerce like that
of the trade between pirates and merchants of the North American colonies. They would
no longer put up with the political and diplomatic dire straits that pirate attacks had,
placing them at the mercy of disgruntled indigenous forces like the Mughal
administration and associated businessmen. The Company and crown government would
also not tolerate the social challenge posed by pirates living on Madagascar, openly
defying the traditional social hierarchical system of Europe.
These consequences of piracy helped contribute to the English East India
Company seeking to build up strength in the East Indies to combat piracy. They and the
Crown government began building up naval strength and the legal mechanisms to
apprehend and prosecute any and all pirates in an effort to purge the seas of their parasitic
presence. Historian Robert Ritchie claimed that the execution of Kidd marked a distinct
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turning point. American and European piracy of the sort seen in the seventeenth century
would face a sharp decline.112
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Part II
The Angres

European and American piracy might be on the brink, but indigenous
manifestations of piracy had existed as a long-term problem in the Indian Ocean region as
well. A notable threat in this regard existed in the Angre family ruling in the
Southwestern Indian coast, also known as the Konkan (many sources called it the
Malabar Coast). The British East India Company, now stronger militarily and with
Crown government forces, had to contend with this threat in the region. The Angres
challenged their status as a sovereign ruling and trading power. The Company in the
same way challenged the Angres. Many historians now view the Angres as a legitimate
regional political entity that had split off from the Maratha empire/confederacy.
The Angres had a strong naval arm and attempted to wield sovereignty over
coastal waters and impose the buying of dustucks, or passes, for trading vessels going
through those waters. The Company’s belief in its own exceptionalism led to tension and
conflict on the seas as they viewed this entity as a band of blood-thirsty pirates. This led
to mixed messages being presented as to whether it existed as a true political entity, or as
an organized pirate fleet. Open conflict with the Angre’s resulted in their ultimate defeat
at the hands of an English East India Company expeditionary force in 1756 under
Admiral Charles Watson and Robert Clive against the fortress at Gheria (modern day
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Vijaydurg). In the contest between the rival European capitalist Atlantic world and the
traditional Indian Ocean world, the later lost the proverbial arm wrestle during this time.
This Company victory served as the first step towards the first stages of the British
Empire forming in India.
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Chapter 4
The Angrian Scourge and Governor Boone

The British East India Company had to also fight off indigenous manifestations of
piracy, notably in the form of the Angres. The Angres attempted to claim a measure of
sovereignty for themselves by affiliating themselves with the Marathas, who used them to
patrol coastal waters of the Konkan coast. Ultimately though, they acted as pirates in
order to enforce a shipping pass system and naval dominance over the region. This of
course put them at odds with the Company, who claimed the right to freely traverse
regional waters and claimed regional sovereignty as well. The Angres tried to exercise
their terms upon the Company, leading to a long period of ship seizures and open warfare
between the two. Company Governor of Bombay, Charles Boone, took the matter into his
own hands and engaged in a largescale attempt to destroy the power of the Angres.
One can see from the sources that Malabar piracy had been perceived to have
existed for a long time in the area. A journal belonging to John Jourdain from the earlyseventeenth century recalled to readers that the existence of these pirates between
“Duball” and the Red Sea caused captains to alter their sailing patterns. Such captains
made sure to leave with other ships in a convoy.113 Jourdain related a trip where the ship
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he sailed on escorted a Portuguese trading vessel: “Wee kept neere the shore because the
Portugall shipp was afraid of the Mallabars.”114 John Fryer expressed similar sentiments
about the danger and tenacity of these pirates in his account about his voyages in the East
Indies. He discussed a landmark “justly called by us Sacrifice Island; in remembrance of
a bloody Butchery on some English by the Pirate Malabars, who are the worst Pickeroons
on this Coast, going in Fleets, and are set out by the Great Men ashore; the Chief of
whom lives at Durmapatan.”115 Even at this stage, a form of organized and violent piracy
seems to be occurring amongst the Malabar pirates on India’s western coast.
More important to the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries is the rise
of Kanhoji Angre, Tulaji’s predecessor. According to the historian Patricia Risso, he
most likely had some local political power on the Konkan Coast (often times claimed to
be the Malabar Coast by European sources, which is actually further to the north). Being
a coastal power, he owned a significant private naval force that acted in a variety of ways
to ultimately serve his own ends. He attacked ships when it suited him, but he also
worked out private agreements with political and economic entities on the ground. He
pledged to representatives of these entities to not attack their ships or to sometimes lend
military support.116
Contemporary British sources such as A Compendious History of the Indian Wars,
by Clement Downing, attempted to explain Kanhoji Angre’s rise to power. This source,
which should be taken with some skepticism, proposes two possibilities for his rise. One
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suggested him to be son of common stock that unrightfully seized power for himself
through trickery and deceit by claiming to be the son of the son of the Grand Sedey’s
(local political leader near the Bombay area) sister. Thus, Downing posed that some
believed that Kanhoji Angre came into power and received the land and boats that made
him a powerful figure. Downing wrote: “the Island of Kenerey was in the Grand Sedey’s
possession, and that he gave it to Angria, with several small galleywats [a small, armed
boat]: this makes many say he was born a nobleman, and that his father was a very great
man.”117
Another report claimed Kanhoji Angre to be simply an enterprising young man
who rose to power with his own means. Whatever the case, he began a career path that
soon clashed with the Company, building himself into the successful pirate admiral he
had become around the publication of Clement Downing’s work: “after he came to man’s
estate, with four or five companions, in the night, went away in one of the Company’s
galleywats, directly to Kenerey, which had been fortified by the Portuguese.” Instead of
splicing himself into local powers, this report claimed that he stole a Company vessel and
took the abandoned island of Kenerey for himself.118 From this point, he began to seize
small fishing vessels and soon became a significant threat to English fishing and
transportation interests in the Bombay area. This soon prompted an English response.
Shipbuilders in Surat constructed a 12-gun vessel to guard the fishery and a yacht to
transport Company governors. Kanhoji Angre at this point began working with the Grand
Sedey and received support from him. This bolstered his power enough to take a
Portuguese grab [small, native-style armed boat], which he fitted out and promptly
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“declared open war with all nations.” Kanhoji continued to build up power until his first
encounter with Company shipping. These accounts, even though seemingly conjectural,
show how the English saw Kanhoji Angre as rising to power through illegitimate
means.119
Through examining both these potential narratives, whether being completely true
or far from it, one can conclude that Clement Downing and like-minded Englishmen
considered Kanhoji to be a native upstart. He had gathered power himself by either
tapping into a local nobility he did not belong in or he stole it by seizing an island and a
small navy. If the first narrative happened to be true, Kanhoji had abused what all
middling to elite class Englishmen held dear as a just political and social system. Kanhoji
had become an imposter nobleman and interloper in a tightly contained class that could
only be properly accessed by birth or royal appointment. In doing so, he had sidestepped
the respected system of primogeniture in a way; firstborn sons receive their father’s
property upon death. He had unrightfully and unlawfully received land and power that
did not belong to him, but to the true sons of local nobility.
The second narrative is more belittling than the first, making Kanhoji out to be a
common thief of Company property in his first act of piracy. Through seaborne
predations, he built up his power base enough to begin preying on the legitimate
commerce of the English East India Company and other European trading entities,
supposedly making himself a combatant against all the world’s shipping. By effect of
even his first theft, he had made himself out to be what the English called an enemy to all
mankind: a pirate. In this narrative, instead of improperly receiving power he had
improperly seized power that did not belong to him, but to the local nobility. In this
119
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version, he did not pretend to be a noble, but definitely began to wield a similar level of
power.
The Malabar pirates under the command of the Angres existed first and foremost
as a significant challenge to European trade hegemony in the Indian Ocean. Being
affiliated with the Marathas, technically holding the post of admiral, Kanhoji Angre took
it as his duty to attempt to wield sovereignty over Maratha territorial waters. This
included regulating the flow of merchant traffic and making sure the appropriate customs
dues were paid. This typically involved enforcing a dustuck system, or a system of
authorized passes. Basically, any ships passing through Kanhoji Angre’s region of
operations would have been expected to buy passes from him. Such policies were
extended even to the likes of the British East India Company, whom they saw as a
frequent offender of trade and customs policies.120
The Angres also challenged the Company in regards to their governing structure.
Like American and European piracy based on Madagascar, Malabar pirates existed in the
eyes of the Company as taking part in a form of anti-government to the established
monarchical system. They affiliated themselves with the Marathas, who had composed
themselves among polities that had split from the Mughal Empire. The English East
India Company knew how to interact with most existing political systems in India
because most had an existing monarchy themselves, like the Mughals. The Maratha
Confederacy, or empire as it sometimes is called, seemed less defined. Both
“confederacy” and “empire” refer to a collection of different peoples, which in the
Maratha case implied them having their own autonomous or semi-autonomous power.
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Plus, leaders like Kanhoji and Tulaji Angre were seen by the English as unlawfully
holding power that should belong to proper systems of government or entities such as
trading enterprises linked to monarchical systems; like the English East India.121
For the reasons of a questionable rise to power, being a challenge to trade
hegemony, and taking part in some fashion in an illegitimate form of government, the
British disregarded the Angre’s and the Maratha’s claims to sovereign control over their
local waters. The Company sent ships through without paying customs dues and the
appropriate dustucks. In response, the Maratha leadership gave Kanhoji Angre permission
to begin aggressive operations against the Company’s English merchant shipping in the
area. He seized multiple ships and large amounts of cargo. The Marathas saw this as a
legally just policy. Trade would have been a huge boost of revenue to the Maratha state
and the English were breaking Maratha laws and keeping them from collecting a
potentially lucrative source of revenue.122
The British East India Company saw recent and subsequent seizures as an
illegitimate entity unjustly victimizing their shipping. English Company attitudes towards
these events is illustrated with the comment of John Gayer, governor of Bombay since
1694. He claimed of the Marathas that “they have grown very insolent.”123 One notable
attack received coverage by Clement Downing, who recorded the attack on a Company
yacht traveling to Carwar. A Mr. Chown, recently made “Governor of the factory at
Carwar,” had decided to take passage on this ship. His wife, Mrs. Catherine Cooke,
likewise went with him. She happened to be pregnant at the time. They sailed in convoy
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with a small man-o-war, but this did not stave off the Maratha attack that they
experienced.124
The small convoy sailed from Bombay in late 1712. They still happened to be
within sighting distance of the city when the attack occurred. Clement Downing related
“Angria attack’d them with his grabs, and they begun a smart and bloody battle.”
Downing did not spare graphic detail, possibly embellishing the episode. Amidst the
exchange of cannon fire, Governor Chown “had his right arm shot off, and bled to death
in the young lady’s arms, for want of the assistance of a surgeon.” In a seemingly last
selfless act, Governor Chown requested of his wife to marry again upon his death. She
agreed to “alter her condition, to accept of Mr. William Gifford, one of the Council of the
Island of Bombay.”125
The Angrians successfully captured the British East India Company yacht and
carried off the survivors into captivity. The escort, the Defiance, returned to Bombay and
alerted the Company president and governing Council. They collected a ransom of
30,000 rupees and began negotiations with the Angres. Downing related how the Angres
soon released Mrs. Catherine Cooke from captivity after receiving the ransom payment.
He described her as being sentenced to depravity of the harshest proportions. When
released “the gentlemen who were sent to pay the ransom were obliged to wrap their
clothes about her, to cover her nakedness.” In addition, “she most courageously
withstood all Angria’s base usage, and endured his insults beyond expectation.” Mrs.
Catherine Cooke became a symbol of how the Company viewed the Angrians. They were
base individuals that took part in piracy upon whomever they chose. This evil had not
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only poised itself against the Company, but even extended to a helpless, morally upright
English woman like Mrs. Cooke. The Angrians had attempted to destroy family itself by
killing her husband, but she overcame all odds. She gave birth to her child and remarried,
this time to Gifford.126
Kanhoji Angre continued to harass local and Company shipping. He “grew very
insolent again,” as Downing commented. Many victimized vessels put up “gallant
defences,” but were overcome nonetheless. For what the British East India Company saw
as a band of pirates, the Angrians achieved a large degree of success and proved to be a
significant nuisance. This proved enough for the Company to seek peace with them in
order to preserve their trading interests. The Company realized they were currently in a
weakened position locally. Downing commented that “hardly any shipping could pass or
re-pass.” Unfortunately for the Company, the military resources available were not
sufficient to continue hostilities with the Angres. The city of Bombay itself “was
unwalled, and no grabs or frigates to protect any thing but the fishery; except a small
munchew, which had escaped when Angria took the Company’s yacht.”127
Clement Downing in his same work strangely mentioned another encounter with
armed Angrian shipping that more resembled a standard search and seizure operation.
The Angrian ship and its crewmen involved appeared to be operating like calm
professionals and that they were merely following procedure, even if it happened at the
expense of Company operations running smoothly. Downing himself, along with a
Captain Holt, boarded the Thomas for Mangalore in order to pick up rice to victual the
fleet at Bombay. During this trip, Downing noted that there were strange ships in the

126
127

Downing, A Compendious History of the Indian Wars, 7-9.
Downing, A Compendious History of the Indian Wars, 10.

88
roads. These ships decided to take advantage of a fresh sea breeze around noontime and
“they came down on us with tearing sail into the road.” The Thomas made itself stand to,
preparing for a possible defensive action: “We had put ourselves in as good a posture of
defence at that time as we could; we had but ten small guns on board; none carrying
above three-pound shot.”128
Before they could get into range, the Boatswain informed Downing that these
ships did belong to the Angres: “they were Angria’s grabs; there were five of them, stout
vessels, well mann’d, and large guns on board.” They did not fire upon the Thomas. They
did send their boats alongside with crewmen that climbed aboard. Compared with the
seizure of the Company yacht mentioned earlier, this Angrian operation proved to be very
low key and without violence. Downing explained this as being due to the peace treaty
“made at the redemption of Mrs. Gifford; and that peace had been renewed by Governor
Boone at his arrival at Bombay.” Downing and the second mate were detained for four to
five hours, causing them reasonable disquiet.129
The Angrians that detained Downing questioned him about the ship and what they
were doing in the area. He related “My heart began to ach, no knowing what they
intended to do with me. Then they ask’d where we belong’d to, or whether we had a pass
from the Governor of Bombay; I told them yes, tho’ I did not at that time rightly know so
much.” His nervousness proved to be unnecessary though. The Angrians proved to be
relatively civil: “They never offered to misuse us, nor do us any manner of harm; only
detained us four or five hours, while they sent on board and rummaged the ship all over.”
Their “treasure” had been sent ashore earlier, so there existed no reason to worry about it
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being offloaded by the rummagers. Downing had sent a boat ashore to recall the captain
of the vessel, who produced a shipping pass issued by Governor Charles Boone of
Bombay. This cleared up any issues the Angrian forces present could possibly have with
the Thomas and its crew and passengers. Nonetheless, Downing and the others “were
heartily glad when we got clear of Angria, and took in our freight of rice with all possible
expedition.” They wanted to take care of business as quickly as possible to avoid any
more run-ins with the Angrians.130
From examining Angrian ship seizures, it is apparent that the very methods of
operation used by the Angres also served as indications of their being piratical. The naval
tactics and types of shipping used by the Angres seemed to indicate this sort of intent.
The British crown government and British East India Company were well familiar with
American and European pirates. These pirates used relatively small sea craft that
depended on speed and the ability to get crewmen close enough to board a potential
victim. The Angres did basically the same. However, their use of small sea craft seemed
to happen on almost on a larger scale. A print from John Biddulph’s book illustrated a
British East Indiaman facing a swarm of small craft called “gallivants.” These were small
vessels that usually contained a single sail and one small caliber cannon for armament.
Like European and American counterparts, Angrian forces utilized these to outmaneuver
slower enemies and to get crewmen on board to seize vessels. They also used “Grabs,”
which were slightly larger vessels that could bring more cannon to bear in a fight.131
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Figure 6- “Maratha Grabs and Gallivats Attacking an English Ship.” Anonymous.

Somewhat of a turning point had occurred in 1715 with the arrival of Charles
Boone as the new Governor of Bombay, who instituted essentially an aggressive military
policy and rearmament. He began a program of increasing the British East India
Company’s naval strength and applying the land forces of the Company to break down
the authority of the Angres by beginning attacks on their forts. Rather impressively, he
had commissioned and built three frigates for use by the Company’s naval arm, the
Bombay Marine. This had all occurred only six months after Boone’s arrival in India.
Things seemed to be remotely peaceful still, but the Angres by no means gave up on their
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coastal policies.132 Boone logically saw the Angres as a threat and renewed open
hostilities with them. Downing mentioned preparations for a large siege of what is
probably Gheria (“Gayra,” or modern Vijaydurg) in April 1717. He mustered a large
naval force with a large company of marines to seize the fort and defeat the Angres once
and for all.133
Boone sent out his British East India Company navy and marine task force to
Gheria, located only twelve hours sailing distance from Bombay. The fleet arrived, and
preparations were made to create a breach in the strong fortifications to capture the
Angrian installation. They soon encountered misfortune however. The fortifications of
Gheria sat atop a highly rocky island, making it hard to walk upon without losing
purchase. The Company forces attempted to send in a fire-ship to destroy Angrian
shipping, but this did not succeed because their vessels had been secured in a nearby
creek. A large boom strung across the creek barred passage. The Company could only
bombard the garrison itself for the moment. They poured on an intense rate of fire, but to
little avail. After destroying some of the structures within the fortifications, the shells did
not even go off on impact when contacting with the rocky terrain of the island and
because of user error. Downing related “we kept throwing our shells as fast as we could
in regular time, cooling our chambers before we loaded again, after we had beat down
two or three houses in the castle, the shells fell on the rocks in the inside of the castle, and
their force of falling would break them without so much as their blowing up, which was
supposed to be owing to the fuse of the shells burning too long.”134
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In addition to failures in bombardment, the task force had difficulties bringing
their land forces to bear on the fortifications. The walls were too high, which prevented
an escalade; or the storming of a fortification with ladders to get marines onto the walls.
The Company task force soon found their task near impossible to complete. They
continued their efforts for “four days, and endeavoured to beat down the castle with our
guns; but in vain.” Meanwhile, they also attempted to send land forces to set fire to the
Angrian ships, but once again efforts were frustrated by challenges of terrain: “the land
was all swampy, and so very muddy by the spring tides flowing over, that we could not
succeed.” Then these forces on the withdrawal faced sporadic fire from the
fortifications.135
The 1717 expedition had ultimately failed. The Angrians had been in a wellfortified emplacement surrounded by geographical difficulties that kept the Company
task force from succeeding. They embarked on a full withdrawal back to Bombay on
April 18. Downing, almost out of frustration, commented that there were probably only
about “a hundred men in the castle, during the time of the siege.” He concluded this by
the lack of a nearby town and by the slow rate of fire from the fortress guns.136 For
supposedly being pirates, the Angres had a good defensive position, consisting of wellbuilt fortifications that took advantage of the local terrain. Also, they possessed facilities
to store and protect their ships from danger. Historian MacDougall provides a lengthy
description of the technical aspects of the facilities at Gheria. In addition to having a
harbor, he writes, the Angres possessed extensive facilities to support defenders and
seafarers and to build and repair their ships. Facilities for ships supposedly proved
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appropriate to work on ships up to around 500 tons, with which the British equivalent
vessel at the time happened to be a 20-gun single deck British sixth rate. Whatever the
case, the Angres were organized and possessed impressive resources to harass the
Company.137
Governor Boone continued to plan attacks and engage in aggressive military
ventures to stop the Angres, but to little avail. He mustered another task force in
November 1718 to capture the island of Kennerey, extremely close to Bombay itself.
This attempt failed as well.138 Another later plan to take Gheria influenced planners to
seek a technical and engineering solution. Governor Boone commissioned the Phram to
be built. It would be “a floating castle, or a machine that should be almost cannon-proof.”
Half ship, half floating gun platform, it boasted thick timber hulls meant to armor it
enough to allow it to get close to Gheria’s fortress walls. Then its 24, 48-pounder
mounted cannon could open fire at close range and create a breach. Another Company
task force took the Phram with it on yet another fortress siege around 1721, once again
on Gheria. A seizure failed to materialize, and the Phram failed to land any shots on the
fortress and seemed to be more of a threat to its own forces than the enemy. Its armor
failed to protect the crew as well. With the only boast being two enemy ships set on fire,
the Company forces abandoned the siege yet again. The Phram, into which the Company
had invested a lot of hope and resources, later caught fire. Pirates had slipped into the
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midst of the Bombay fleet and, in a panic, officers set fire to it to keep it out of the hands
of enemies.139
Boone’s attacks ultimately were resulting in failure and nothing but a drain of
British East India Company resources. Company Directors persuaded the British Crown
government to send naval support to protect shipping. Commodore Thomas Matthews
arrived with a squadron of men-o-war in 1722. Even then, this proved to not be enough.
Boone conducted next a siege of Colaba, this time from land. Granted, the royal navy
squadron had the task of securing supremacy over local waters in order to keep enemy
shipping from reaching Colaba; they still were unable to play an active role. Plus, the
Portuguese sent forces to aid the English as well. A joint British East India Company and
Portuguese force attempted to take the fort at Colaba, but were overwhelmed by a
Maratha land force. Governor Boone sailed back to Britain after this failure. The Angrian
scourge had remained resolute and had borne the brunt of Company attempts to break its
power.140
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Chapter 5
Robert Clive the Pirate Hunter

Circumstances outside of the British East India Company’s control proved to be
in its favor more than its hitherto vain attempts at military success. Kanhoji Angre died in
1729, with no stable means of succession to fill his former position of power. As a result,
his sons competed for power and formed their own factions, squabbling over their
father’s power and resources. But ultimately, conflict between the two brothers Manaji
and Tulaji led to a decline in Maratha-affiliated Angre naval strength. Tulaji still proved
enough of a nuisance to the Company however. The Peshwa, or Prime Minister, of the
Maratha Confederation reached out to the Company for an alliance, and the two set out to
destroy Tulaji Angre. The Marathas had essentially turned on Tulaji.141 With local allied
support, Royal Navy support, and a divided and declining enemy; the British East India
Company could now inflict significant military defeats upon the Angres as shown in
events of the 1750s. The Company by itself had enough resources now to provide
somewhat better protection for trade in the region as well. Contemporary writer Robert
Orme related that by 1755 the Angrians based at Gheria usually only seized unescorted
shipping. Nevertheless, it should be noted that armed escorts were still necessary. Orme
did mark that around the year of 1755 that the Company began to have successes against
141
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the Angres, who had for fifty years been “formidable to trading ships of all European
nations in India.” The British East India Company and their Peshwa-led Maratha allies in
1755 launched an attack on the fortress of Suvarnadurg. They applied overwhelming
force and overcame the installation. Amazingly, “this was all the work of one day.” Past
failures of the early-eighteenth century had been miraculously reversed. Orme gave major
credit to Royal Navy Commodore Matthew James, who had finally managed to reduce
one of Tulaji Angre’s “fortified harbours.” This served as the first step in a plan to also
capture Gheria, which ended in success and the eventual furtherance of the British
Empire into India.142
Admiral Charles Watson arrived in Bombay in November 1755, after the recent
success against Suvarnadurg. His superiors planned to work with the Marathas again in
order “to strike at once at the root of Angria’s power, by attacking Gheria: the capital of
his dominions, and the principle harbour and arsenal of his marine force.” Commodore
Matthew James conducted a reconnaissance mission of the fortified island and concluded
that, though formidable, it could in fact be taken. British East India Company and
Maratha naval forces blockaded the target and held their position until the rest of the task
force could arrive. According to Orme, this occurred on February 11. The forces brought
to bear on Gheria were “four ships of the line, of 70, 64, 60, and 50 guns, one of 44, three
of 20, a grab of 12, and five bomb ketches, all in fourteen vessels. Besides the seamen,
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they had on board a battalion of 800 Europeans with 1000 sepoys under the command of
lieutenant Colonel Clive.” They expected to inflict a decisive defeat.143
Robert Clive, Lieutenant-Colonel in the land forces of the British East India
Company, finally got a chance to fight. After arriving in 1755, he had been disappointed
by not being able to march against the French in the Deccan. Chance would have it that
Admiral Watson heard of him in Bombay and invited him along on the expedition against
Gheria. Clive, in his pursuit of self-advancement, had turned pirate hunter. He played a
key role in this operation by commanding the Company’s land forces.144
The British, sensing treachery amongst their Maratha allies and Tulaji Angre,
decided to proceed with their attempt to take the fort. Admiral Watson tried to establish
contact with the defenders, but failed to do so. Due to the lack of response, he deployed
his ships to conduct a bombardment. They anchored opposite the northern section of
fortifications and “began, at the distance of fifty yards, to batter them with 150 pieces of
cannon; the bomb ketches at the same time plied their mortars.” To the extraordinary luck
of the British, a single mortar shell fell on one of the Angrian grabs tied up. The fire from
this spread and soon caught the entire Angrian fleet on fire. By this conflagration, “in less
than an hour, this fleet, which had for fifty years been the terror of the Malabar coast, was
utterly destroyed.” Ironically, a longstanding threat almost providentially disappeared
with a single shot.145
The enemy’s fleet had been neutralized, but the fort and its defenders remained.
Company forces continued to hammer away at the red stone walls that fortified the
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island. Internal rivalry and fear of Maratha collaboration with the enemy prompted the
Company to quicken operations and send ashore the European and native sepoy troops
under Robert Clive’s command. He strategically took a position between the Marathas
and the fort. The morning of the next day, the bombardment resumed. Land batteries now
fired upon enemy positions in addition to the ships anchored offshore. The garrison
belonging to Tulaji Angre finally surrendered. Colonel Clive quickly moved his forces to
the fort to establish an occupation, meaning to keep it out of Maratha hands. This proved
a smart move on the part of the Company. In addition to taking the fortress, the Company
and the Royal Navy partook of the rich spoils held within, including a stockpile of
armaments and supplies, listed as “200 pieces of cannon, six brass mortars, and a great
quantity of ammunition, and military and naval stores of all kinds.” Monetary spoils were
more to the interest of the commanders, however, and all of the expedition’s British
leaders helped themselves to a substantial share each. They divided amongst themselves
approximately £120,000.146
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Figure 7. "A view of Geriah as it was taken by the British fleet under the command of the
Admirals Watson and Pocock 13 February 1756." M. Hore and W. Tringham.

The successful outcome of the expedition of Gheria greatly increased the riches,
skills, and prestige of the British leaders involved. Commodore Matthew James got the
smallest share of the riches taken, which amounted to about £2,000. James later retired
with this money in 1759 to become an influential English country gentleman. Clive and
Watson had both taken part in the spoils, but their work in India had just begun. Clive
returned to Bombay after the expedition and became deputy governor of Fort St. David.
The governing Council soon sent both Clive and Watson on an expedition to defeat the
Nawab of Bengal, Siraj-ud-Daulah, who had recently attacked and captured Calcutta.
According to reports received, the Nawab had also inflicted severe deprivations on the
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English troops there by forcing them all into a small prison called the Black Hole. Many
died on that night due to heat and suffocation made worse by the Monsoon season. Clive
and Watson thus moved against the Nawab. Both men in the attack on Gheria had gained
experience on how to conduct land-sea operations, which would prove of great use
against the Nawab.147
After negating the Angrian threat, the Marathas started reclaiming lands they had
previously lost to them. Historian MacDougall claims that after the Gheria expedition the
Maratha navy had been weakened detrimentally. They continued to patrol their own
waters and enforce their dustuck system, but now turned their attention landward. The
now land-focused Marathas would soon come into conflict with the British East India
Company. Robert Clive, having begun his second stint in India fighting pirates,
skyrocketed in status and power in following campaigns against the Nawab of Bengal
and the French forces there. Like the Marathas, the Company also embarked on territorial
acquisition. Clive and Watson battled with the Nawab and their French allies in Bengal.
This ended with the ousting from power and eventual murder of the Nawab and the
French to lose their key operating base of Chandernagore. Conflict with the French
served as colonial spillover from the Seven Years War, prompting them to embark on
military campaigns on the coast of Coromandel that also had to be contended with by
British forces. After a ceasing of hostilities, Robert Clive effectively and officially gained
the provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa under the administrative power of the
Company in 1765. This began the status of the Company as a large-scale territorial power
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in the Indian subcontinent, and later the British Empire itself. Clive’s episode of pirate
hunting preceded all of this.148
Ultimately, the Angre’s reign of terror on local and European shipping in the
Indian Ocean can be seen in multiple ways, but mostly served as another form of piracy.
The Angres were a challenge to Company trade hegemony in the area first and foremost.
They seized ships for profit and to meet their own ends. If the accounts of people like
Downing can be believed, the Angres also existed as a form of anti-government, antiestablishment, and anti-English values to the then considered proper system of
government bolstered by the power of the nobility. They were the ones who justly
wielded and retained power, not those who weaseled their way into a class of nobility or
seized the power for themselves.
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Figure 8. “A plan of the town and fortress of Gariah, belonging to Angria the Admiral to the
Sahou Rajah on the Coast of Mallabar.” Sylvanus Urban.

Sources pertaining to the Angres and their navy are confusingly not consistent
among British writers and sources. Some tried to portray Angre naval commanders as
pirates, while others portrayed them as more legitimate leaders. A map produced after the
siege of Gheria in a magazine from the latter half of the eighteenth century happened to
be titled "A plan of the town and fortress of Gariah, belonging to Angria the Admiral to
the Sahou Rajah on the Coast of Mallabar.” This obviously shows that this writer viewed
them as a legitimate political enemy of the British. Angria is titled as an “Admiral”
serving a recognized “Sahou Rajah.” Other written sources, particularly accounts of
events in India during the second half of the eighteenth century, however, titled the
Angres differently. For example, Clement Downing titled his related work: A
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Compendious History of the Indian Wars; With and Account of the Rise, Progress,
Strength, and Forces of Angria the Pyrate. Through such a title choice he portrayed the
Angres as upstarts and thugs that possessed a simple flotilla that somehow proved to be
of enough nuisance to the British East India Company to necessitate a coalition of British
and Maratha forces to siege and take his fort at Gheria. This happened in 1756 by
Admiral Watson and Robert Clive.149 Historians now typically claim he existed as a
leader of a legitimate navy of a legitimate political entity, but the fact still remains that
the Angres took part in piratical behavior.
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Conclusion

The British East India Company’s power and influence increased in the Indian
Ocean, alongside increasing threats posed by piracy; they began to possess more and
more resources that could be, and had to be, mobilized against piracy with greater
effectiveness. Piracy had important effects on the Company ranging from large financial
losses to destabilizing economic, political, and diplomatic difficulties, and attributes of
society in the region and abroad, necessitating that such criminal sea forces be dealt with.
American and European piracy around the time of the later seventeenth century (c.a.
1680) and into the mid-eighteenth (c.a. 1760) obtained key focus in this study. Piracy of
the Malabar coast in the manifestation of the Angres also obtained coverage.
Piracy, in all cases across chronological and geographical expanses, has always
had detrimental economic effects on the entities upon which it preyed. This can obviously
be seen with the day-to-day happenings of pirates in the Indian Ocean: seizures of ships
and their goods. Pirates like William Kidd only needed to plunder one indigenous vessel
to be set for life in riches. These and other vessels could have several thousands of
pounds sterling of moveable wealth and goods that could be sold off. Piracy also
inadvertently caused an illicit cycle of commerce to spring up from the Pirate Round.
Traders and ship owners in England’s North American colonies began to fund ventures to
send vessels to Madagascar on supposed slaving missions. This did take place, but on the
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journey out, such vessels brought loads of supplies and weapons to sell to the pirate
crews staying temporarily or permanently on the island or surrounding islands. In return,
the pirates would sometimes exchange East India goods for them. When these ships
returned to the North American colonies, they would be considered in the eyes of English
law as illegally trafficking East India goods.
Piracy in the Indian Ocean had radical political and diplomatic implications for
the English East India Company. The Mughals placed key blame on them for any pirate
attacks that occurred in the Indian Ocean against their shipping. This would result in a
breakdown in relations between them. The Mughals in each instance demanded what they
saw as just recompense for what had occurred. Besides, the Company had proclaimed
themselves as the masters of regional waters. The Mughals and those affiliated with the
Mughals rather shrewdly used this as leverage to make them pay for losses and to provide
convoy protection for vessels going into the Red Sea on the Hajj pilgrimage and for trade.
With each progressing instance, like the attacks of 1691 and 1692, Henry Avery
in 1695, and William Kidd in 1698, more and more convoy protection obligations were
expected of the English and other European trading companies by Emperor Aurangzeb
and his subjects. Piracy of this sort even influenced the highest levels of diplomacy. The
Sir William Norris embassy to the Great Mughal Emperor in mid-1701 had been tainted
by recent attacks, like the one made by William Kidd on the Quedah Merchant. This of
course influenced the Mughal Emperor to look unfavorably on Norris’ entreaties and
demand that, once again, the English invest more resources into protecting his ships.
European and American Piracy even had influences on social factors of the Indian
Ocean region. Pirate crews already employed enlightenment ideas in terms of
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egalitarianism and social contract. When they stopped at Madagascar for however long
they decided, this mode of thought became rooted on land. Thus, pirate republican
settlements reportedly formed, but probably not on the scale of the more fictional
Libertalia. Thus, pirates were forming societies that in their way of operating blatantly
opposed the more traditional monarchical systems of Mughal India, the English, and
others. Many pirates also just merely grafted themselves into indigenous princedoms on
Madagascar and surrounding islands. They provided valuable military service to
competing princes and climbed up their hierarchical ladder to high positions, sometimes
even becoming princes themselves. Even though they had interacted with societal
systems by way of embracing traditional monarchy, they still did so by opposing the
traditional monarchical system they had come from and been used to.
When encountering these issues brought on by pirates, and the dire consequences
they had, the British East India Company increased its physical manifestations of power
in the region by its own means and by imploring the Crown government to lend aid by
way of military forces. They also engaged in temporary local alliances. This can be most
well seen with how the Company contested with the Angres on the Southwestern Indian
coast. Governor Boone contributed greatly by attempting to dislodge the Angres from
power by building up Company naval power and by attacking Angrian coastal fortresses,
but ultimately failed. The death of Kanhoji Angre and subsequent infighting played a key
role in weakening their power, leaving Tulaji alone and susceptible to Company
predations. Coincidently, Robert Clive happened to be let down by not getting to go on a
recent expedition into the interior. Admiral Watson recruited him for his venture against
the now weakened Angres, who were known to the British as pirates. As such, Watson
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and Clive led an expedition to their fortress at Vijaydurg in 1756 and forced it to submit.
The East India Company had in this instance shown it had accrued enough military
strength in the Indian Ocean to put down even large groupings of pirates like the Angres.
The Atlantic and Indian Ocean worlds had clashed through the issue of piracy, but the
Atlantic had triumphed and managed to secure power over indigenous forces.
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